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ABSTRACT 
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon 
at high altitude are capable of causing widespread destruction in the U.S. homeland with 
few to no immediate casualties. The threat of nuclear EMP attack against the United 
States was recognized as probable during the Cold War but as time passed, the threat lost 
consciousness among U.S. policy makers as other issues and threats rose to the forefront. 
Simultaneously, the United States military and civilian society grew increasingly reliant 
upon emerging electronic systems and capabilities while adversary nations and rogue 
states rapidly pursued nuclear weapons capabilities. Today, the United States, as one of 
the most highly developed nations on the globe, is reliant upon electronic systems for 
almost every aspect of life, from communications to economics and security. As such, the 
United States is highly vulnerable to attacks that affect these cornerstones of U.S. society 
and global presence. The threat of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States today 
and in the future is not only an effective option for both states and non-state actors, it is 
an attractive one. Adversaries could derive great value from an attack that cripples the 
U.S. ability to function at even the most basic levels. The threat of EMP attack is more 
prescient in today’s modern warfare environment than ever before. As such, the United 
States’ approach to nuclear deterrence and escalation control must evolve to fully 
encompass the threat of nuclear EMP by both state and non-state actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The end of the Cold War marked, for many, an end to the prominence of nuclear 
weapons. While Russia and the United States kept large numbers in their arsenals, the 
focus on nuclear weapons shifted from buildup to reduction and the role of nuclear 
weapons in U.S. national security strategy was greatly reduced. The United States largely 
breathed a sigh of relief and shifted focus to domestic issues, other regions of the globe 
such as Asia and, following September 11, 2001, long-term regional conflicts. 
Simultaneously, proliferation quietly continued in states across the globe. China built up 
its nuclear capabilities, Iran and North Korea further pursued nuclear weapons programs 
of their own, India and Pakistan competed in the nuclear realm and Russia continued to 
modernize and implement nuclear deterrence strategies for a multi-polar world. Terrorist 
organizations like al Qaeda stated their intentions to gain access to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) grew in strength, 
number and territory, also stating intentions to use WMD if successfully acquired. As the 
multi-polarity and variety of threats grew, nuclear weapons largely became, from a U.S. 
point of view, a weapon of a bygone era with limited scope and purpose. For other states 
and non-state actors, however, nuclear weapons remained the pinnacle of military 
achievement, a guarantor of safety and security in a world dominated by conventionally 
superior powers like the United States.  
As the global security environment grew increasingly complicated, the technology 
environment blossomed. Electronic systems, internet connectivity, global positioning 
systems (GPS), energy and communications technology improved by leaps and bounds. 
The United States became increasingly reliant upon electronic systems for everything 
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from personal communication to banking to commercial travel to healthcare. Throughout 
the 1970’s, the U.S. military executed the second offset strategy, investing in the 
technological advancements that would provide the military with capabilities like 
extended-range precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft and advanced C4ISR1, all of 
which enabled the strategies of the United States throughout the Cold War and post-Cold 
War eras. Today, 99 percent of the electricity U.S. military bases use comes from the 
civilian electrical grid2. Advanced U.S. military systems depend on electronic systems’ 
interaction with satellites to target, communicate and travel. These capabilities make the 
United States a leader in both commercial and military technology, however they also 
create a significant vulnerability. If the United States experienced widespread electronic 
disruption or failure, the effects would be felt in every aspect of civilian and military life. 
A catastrophic failure of electronic systems would impact the ability of emergency 
services to respond to crisis, running water and access to food over the long term would 
be threatened, communication made extremely difficult, if not impossible in the 
immediate aftermath, and the ability of the U.S. military to respond in any meaningful 
way, both at home and abroad, severely hampered. While this seems in many ways like 
science fiction, the capability exists to cripple the United States’ ability to function at 
even the most basic level – and it has existed since the first nuclear weapon was 
detonated, more than 70 years ago.  
The use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) as a weapon is a long-held concept of warfare, 
especially among U.S. adversaries who have held the capability for decades. During the 
Cold War, the main concern about EMP emanated from the Soviet strategy to cripple or 
extinguish the ability of the United States to retaliate before a second strike on the U.S. 
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homeland could be initiated, in the form of a high-altitude nuclear detonation over the 
United States resulting in widespread EMP. However, this notion was largely rejected as 
a strategy because many theorists of nuclear deterrence believed that the risk was not 
worth the reward for the Soviet Union. If EMP worked as demonstrated in the nuclear 
tests of the 1960’s, it was a suicide mission. Based on the deterrence strategy of the time, 
the United States would undoubtedly respond in kind, all but guaranteeing an 
overwhelming nuclear attack on Soviet territory. The stakes during the Cold War were far 
too high and both sides relied so heavily on the theory of mutually assured destruction 
that the idea of using a nuclear weapon for gaining the upper hand, however briefly, in 
what would ultimately be a nation-ending war was not plausible, nor attractive. Today, 
however, the world is very different. Nuclear weapons are possessed by nine states 
instead of two, all with varying interests and strategic goals and quite different views on 
the implementation of nuclear weapons as a tool of war in the 21st century. Additionally, 
rogue states and non-state actors are potentially capable of launching their own nuclear 
attacks if not now, then in the foreseeable future.  
The risk and reward calculus has changed dramatically for U.S. adversaries who 
seek to achieve strategic effects against the United States, in turn altering the deterrence 
and escalation calculus. An adversary may choose to employ nuclear EMP in theater, 
rather than over the U.S. homeland, rendering U.S. forces abroad incapable of responding 
to regional or allied crises. The risk of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States 
remains unlikely in comparison to smaller scale terror attacks or other security events but 
the consequences of such an attack, if not prevented or deterred, would be catastrophic. 
Yet, while any employment of a nuclear weapon would be viewed by the United States as 
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extremely escalatory and would provoke a serious U.S. response, it is unclear that that 
response would be nuclear. The United States possesses the ability to hold at risk high 
value targets with capabilities other than nuclear weapons, options such as cyber, which 
very well may be considered proportional as a response. High-altitude nuclear 
detonations cause widespread electrical and infrastructure damage, but they rarely result 
in immediate human casualties. Nuclear EMP can also be difficult to attribute, much like 
large-scale cyber-attacks. These factors may very well complicate the U.S. response 
calculus.  
This thesis examines the level of threat a nuclear EMP attack on the U.S. 
homeland or in theater represents in the 21st century modern warfare environment and 
analyzes the effect a threat of nuclear EMP has on deterrence and escalation. The first 
chapter provides an eagle eye view of the international security environment through the 
year 2040 to give context to the issue and remove nuclear EMP from its traditional Cold 
War boundaries. The second chapter identifies how the United States understands the 
conduct of modern warfare and establishes current U.S. deterrence and employment 
policy regarding nuclear weapons. The second chapter will also explore how key U.S. 
adversaries Russia and China are approaching modern warfare and nuclear deterrence in 
the 21st century and introduce how nuclear EMP complicates that environment. The third 
chapter quickly summarizes the history of nuclear EMP, describes the effects of an EMP 
attack versus the effects of a “traditional” employment of a nuclear weapon and 
introduces the historical views of the Soviet Union on EMP attacks during the Cold War. 
The fourth chapter is a case study of the 2003 Northeast blackout, analyzing the effects of 
the blackout on the civilian infrastructure and ability of the city to respond and recover. 
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The level of effect from the blackout is then compared to the estimated effect from 
nuclear EMP employment and identifies the implications for U.S. national security 
domestically and abroad. The fifth chapter explores the utility of nuclear EMP for both 
state and non-state actors and identifies the motivating factors for employing nuclear 
EMP. This chapter will also explore the strategy of employing nuclear EMP as part of a 
larger asymmetric warfare strategy. Finally, the sixth chapter explores the relationship 
between nuclear EMP and deterrence through analyzing how the employment of a 
nuclear weapon to produce EMP effects may change how the United States thinks about 
deterrence in the 21st century and identifying what policy options are available to the 
United States in defining a deterrence strategy specifically designed to prevent a nuclear 
EMP attack. Ultimately, the thesis will conclude with an identification of how likely it is 
that nuclear EMP is to be used in the modern warfare environment, evaluate the level of 
threat to the United States at home and abroad and identify recommendations for the 
United States to best address the threat as it exists in the 21st century.  
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DEFINITIONS 
Nuclear Employment 
There is an ongoing debate over the term nuclear “use” and, depending on the 
community, “use” can mean multiple things. For some, it means the detonation of a 
nuclear weapon in the context of a conflict. For others, it means the use of nuclear 
weapons as a political or deterrent tool. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger 
famously remarked, “We use nuclear weapons every day to deter our potential foes and 
provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection”3. The author of this thesis 
tends to agree with Secretary Schlesinger, that nuclear weapons are indeed in use every 
day as guarantors of security. As such, “nuclear use” will not appear as a package term in 
this thesis so as to avoid confusion. Instead, “employment” will be used as a defining 
term for the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the context of active conflict or attack 
(testing excluded).  
Electromagnetic Pulse 
Electromagnetic pulse is a short burst of electromagnetic energy that, if strong enough, 
can disrupt or destroy electrical components but is not of direct harm to human beings. 
EMP can occur naturally, such as an effect of a strong geothermal storm or lightning 
strikes. There are weapons that exist solely for creating EMP effect, though those are not 
covered in this analysis. The EMP produced by a high-altitude nuclear detonation is 
much stronger and more widespread than any other manmade EMP occurrence, 
comparable only to a geothermal storm that directly affects Earth’s atmosphere. High-
altitude nuclear weapon detonations produce EMP in three waves as defined below4: 
1) E1: An initial energy shockwave that is brief, about 1 microsecond. A 
pulse of energy, similar to extremely strong static electricity, traveling at 
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90% the speed of light, capable of destroying computers and other 
electronic devices in line of sight of the detonation. 
 
2) E2: An intermediate pulse with a very similar effect as a lightning strike, 
unlikely to do damage to electronics or electrical systems already 
protected against surges from lightning strikes. However, most systems 
will be initially damaged from E1 and would likely experience additional 
damage if the protection systems went down in the initial E1 surge. 
 
3) E3: A long-lasting magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) signal, a much slower 
pulse that travels through the magnetic field of the Earth, disrupting or in 
many cases, destroying power lines, electrical transformers and power 
plants. MHD occurs in two phases: Blast (distortion of the Earth’s 
magnetic field lines by the expanding fireball) and Heave (heating and 
ionization of a patch of atmosphere directly below the detonation that rises 
and distorts the Earth’s magnetic field)5. E3 only occurs in high yield 
detonations. 
 
Asymmetric Warfare 
Asymmetric warfare is typically defined as a conflict between actors that have 
significantly disparate levels of capability and as such, the conduct of warfare is 
unconventional. Asymmetric warfare can consist of guerilla tactics, information 
campaigns, cyber-attacks, WMD attacks, escalation of regional conflicts, conducted 
through engagement in proxy wars, or any combination of the aforementioned tactics. It 
is common that asymmetric warfare includes multiple unconventional tactics as part of an 
overall strategy. Attacks like 9/11 or the Sony hack by North Korea are often cited as 
examples of asymmetric warfare. This kind of warfare is becoming increasingly common 
in the 21st century as the relative military power of states becomes more and more 
disparate but access to lethal or disruptive technologies becomes easier.  As is discussed 
further in this thesis, asymmetric warfare will become the norm for threat and conflict in 
the 21st century security environment. State actors will increasingly engage in asymmetric 
behavior as technologies proliferate and the security environment becomes more 
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crowded. Employment of devastating cyber-attacks, nuclear weapons or other WMD to 
create strategic effects in this environment are referred to as strategic asymmetric 
capabilities. 
Rogue State 
Rogue states are often ruled by autocratic regimes and generally hostile towards the 
United States. They often seek WMD capabilities, suppress or violate human rights and 
disrupt regional security. They can be sponsors or partners in terrorism as well. For the 
sake of this paper, when rogue states are mentioned or analyzed it is typically in reference 
to Iran or North Korea. Though these two countries are very different, they are the two 
most often labeled “rogue states”. Iran’s suppression of human rights, record of financing 
or otherwise state-sponsoring terrorist organizations and secret but diligent pursuit of 
nuclear weapons makes it an ideal, if nuanced, example of a rogue state. North Korea is 
more obviously a rogue state based on its isolation from the global order, violations of 
human rights and explicit and determined focus on developing a nuclear weapons 
program. These two rogue states will be focused upon heavily in this thesis as actors 
capable of and willing to employ nuclear EMP, especially in theater.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis took several routes: technology, history and policy oriented. 
In order to best understand the motivations behind a state or non-state actor’s decision to 
employ a nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects, the author first needed to gain an 
understanding and appreciation for the effects of EMP and how they are produced. This 
consisted of reading through scientific journals and congressional testimony about 
electrical pulses (natural and man-made), solar storms and nuclear physics. Next, the 
author studied the 2003 Northeast blackout, not only to gain an understanding for the 
case study but to better understand the vulnerabilities inherent to electrical systems and 
the civilian infrastructure as a whole. Finally, in terms of technical research, the author 
had to understand what was needed to successfully employ a nuclear weapon capable of 
producing EMP effects. For example, it was essential to understand that high-altitude 
nuclear detonations, meaning at least 30km or more above the Earth’s surface, are the 
most effective for producing EMP effects over a wide area. The technologies required to 
achieve a high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon are more intricate than a crude 
nuclear device and a missile.  
For the greatest probability of success, the actor would likely acquire ballistic 
missile capabilities (short- or long-range and in some cases, intercontinental), a 
miniaturized nuclear weapon capable of being fitted to the ballistic missile and a physics 
package capable of withstanding the force of missile launch. However, the capabilities 
required for employment of nuclear EMP are not as complex as those needed for ground 
burst nuclear attack. For example, re-entry technology is not necessarily required. The 
complexity of the challenge was incredibly important to take into account when 
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contemplating the decision calculus of actors possibly looking to employ this capability 
against the United States or its forward-deployed forces in theater.  
There is no credible basis to an analysis about a future threat without first understanding 
the historical basis from which the threat emerged. The methodology on historical 
context involved in-depth research about nuclear testing, specifically focusing on the 
Starfish Prime test, the first U.S. nuclear weapons test that exhibited EMP effects as far 
as 1,000 miles away. It was in this test that nuclear EMP began to emerge as a possible 
weapon in and of itself. The author also looked into Soviet nuclear weapons testing that 
exhibited EMP effects as well.  
As time progressed, Congress and policy makers became increasingly concerned 
about the threat, causing Congress to establish the Commission to Assess the Threat to 
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack in 2001. The reports from this 
commission serve as the basis for the historical context of U.S. policy on the issue and as 
the cornerstone for establishing credibility about the level of threat facing the United 
States today and in the future. They also provide valuable information about the state of 
U.S. infrastructure and its ability to withstand (or not) the effects of nuclear EMP. The 
commission’s report on U.S. critical infrastructure also serves the purpose of framing the 
arguments for adversarial use against the United States as it identifies key vulnerabilities 
and the effects of those vulnerabilities being realized through a devastating natural 
disaster, cyber or nuclear EMP attack. The Commission reports were especially eye-
opening in terms of nuclear EMP as part of a larger asymmetric strategy. This becomes 
important in the analysis of deterrence and escalation decision making later on in the 
discussion.  
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Finally, the author needed to understand the policies enacted by the United States as well 
as potential adversaries on the subject of nuclear EMP, namely in the form of nuclear 
declaratory policies or national statements on the matter, many of which have been 
analyzed by U.S. experts. Russia and China are relatively clear about their broader 
nuclear policies though there is by nature some ambiguity involved in those as well. The 
challenge here was to try to identify the policies or doctrines, if such terms are even 
applicable, to rogue states or non-state actors. Terrorist organizations are by nature more 
declaratory than perhaps their capabilities can support but the history of their actions and 
stated goals give hints as to how they may choose to employ nuclear EMP – or perhaps 
why they would not. Rogue states are somewhat more formal in their statements but even 
in those instances, the sincerity of their claims can often be disputed. The secretive nature 
of rogue states and the actions they take make predictions of their future actions much 
more difficult to ascertain, though their intended goals are in some ways easier to identify 
than that of state actors. It was key to the analysis to make these distinctions as they 
become important when exploring the possible approaches to deterrence.  
This paper will explore all sides to the question of the level of threat represented by 
nuclear EMP. The community debating this question has often been split into two camps: 
the side that believes that this threat is unrealistic or so unlikely that is hardly worth 
preparing to defend against, much less produce deterrence strategies designed specifically 
for the threat, and the side that believes the threat is quite real and without preparing for it 
or strategizing to prevent it, the United States is turning a blind eye to an existential 
threat. This paper aims to remain somewhere in the middle while exploring the virtues 
and misgivings of each side but will, in the end, come to a conclusion about the level of 
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threat nuclear EMP presents to the United States and its citizens. In order to do so, the 
author makes several assumptions upfront about the security environment, the role of the 
United States in the world and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy.  
It is the assumption of the author that the security environment the United States will face 
through 2040 will be one of increasing complexity and instability. This theme will be 
further explored within the following sections but it is fundamental to understanding the 
approach to analysis found herein. If the world were in fact to become more peaceful, 
perhaps through the eradication of terrorism or a more balanced global order, the need for 
this analysis may not exist at all. However, it is in the belief of the author that the security 
environment is more likely to deteriorate in coming decades than stabilize that the 
motivation for exploring this subject in-depth is rooted.  
Similarly, it is the assumption of the author that the United States will not shrink 
from the world stage but will continue to be a conventionally superior global actor with 
global interests. Globalization as a trend is assumed to continue due to communication 
and technological innovation and as a leading contributor to technological change, the 
United States is unlikely to become isolated, much less remain so. As such, U.S. interests 
and allied relationships will remain, meaning the United States will continue to be an 
actor both respected and feared. Threats from outside U.S. borders, it is assumed, will not 
dissipate but remain or grow.  
Finally, the author assumes that nuclear weapons will continue to be a cornerstone 
of U.S. defense policy and strategy. No assumptions are made about the numbers of 
nuclear weapons the United States may retain or if the numbers will grow, only that the 
United States will not reduce to zero. The makeup of the nuclear arsenal – whether it 
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remains a triad or not – is also irrelevant to evaluating this threat. Though the force 
structure may matter to some aspects of formulating deterrence policy, it has little effect 
on the analysis of whether an actor will choose to use nuclear EMP against the United 
States or not. Retaliation with nuclear weapons is retaliation regardless of whether the 
weapon is launched from air, land or sea.  
Throughout the research for this paper the author experienced several challenges. 
The arguments surrounding this threat are somewhat passionate and can feel very much 
like a conversation about science fiction at times. They also tend to be rather extreme in 
some cases – borderline fear mongering on one side and tacit dismissal on the other. 
While this is telling in terms of how split the community is on this issue, it also presented 
a challenge to finding sources that looked at the issue in a balanced and sober manner. 
The Congressional commission reports are the best sources in terms of a practical yet 
serious examination of the threat but they are, at this date, somewhat aged6. Old sources 
are a common problem when it comes to questions of nuclear weapons, though sources 
on deterrence and its practice are much more recent and modern.  
With that in mind, the author looked to three main pools of sources: official 
government sources which assessed the threat and the technical and physical effects on 
the United States, the debates of the community on the validity of the threat one way or 
the other and both classic and modern approaches to nuclear deterrence, many of which 
do not make mention of nuclear EMP but are the best representation of current deterrence 
thinking and strategy. Through the combined analysis of these three pools of sources, the 
author was able to come to conclusions about both the level of threat and how it affects 
traditional approaches to nuclear deterrence and escalation.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO 2040 
The security environment is the driving force behind any threat to the United 
States and will shape U.S. force structure, posture and policy. The security environment 
through 2040 will exhibit several trends key to understanding the environment in which 
the threat of EMP may emanate: technological innovation, proliferation of WMD and 
shifts in regional power dynamics. Combined, these factors will challenging the primacy 
of the United States as a military actor on the global stage. As economic growth 
strengthens East Asia over time, the West may struggle to remain influential. This 
chapter will explore these trends in greater detail over the course of three periods of time7 
and identify the context for the threat of nuclear EMP and the actors who will likely 
acquire the capability to employ nuclear weapons with an intent of EMP effects.  
 
2017-2025 
The next eight years are likely to feature many of the same threats facing the 
United States today, though some will evolve. The threat of high end peer-to-peer 
competition or conflict with states such as Russia and China is likely to rise as both states 
continue to invest heavily in both traditional and hybrid warfare capabilities8.  
Investments in cyber and C4ISR capabilities and increasing numbers of unmanned and 
undersea platforms would complicate and already complex operating environment. The 
military modernization of Russian forces will likely enable continued open challenges to 
U.S. and NATO security, much like the activities undertaken in Crimea, Ukraine in 2013. 
Chinese economic growth will enable their ability to bolster military modernization9 and 
provide a platform for continued buildup in the South China Sea, contributing to rising 
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regional tensions. The United States will likely continue to monitor the competitive 
balance of power in the Middle East, shaped by the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan. 
Unconventional warfare tactics and capabilities will begin to emerge more 
frequently10 as rogue states and non-state actors continue to acquire, expand and improve 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, coordinated and sophisticated 
intelligence/espionage campaigns, mine and swarming capabilities and autonomous and 
deep learning machines. The importance of nuclear weapons in the defense strategies of 
the United States, Russia, China, and NATO is likely to rise as developing nuclear 
weapons programs in North Korea (and, potentially Iran) accelerate11 and regional 
tensions grow. Health programs designed to defend against chemical and biological 
attacks will likely seek increased funding as a result of the increased threat of WMD 
employment by non-state actors, much like has been witnessed in Syria. Global 
insurgency by non-state and/or state-sponsored terror organizations, such as Al-Qaeda 
and ISIL, is likely to influence targeted countries to increasingly adopt defensive stances 
and focus on security operations at home, including tightening immigration controls. 
Simultaneously, terror attacks, both lone-wolf and organized, are likely to grow in 
frequency and intensity12 as counter-terror operations and strategies are implemented and 
terror organizations are challenged in key regions. 
As technological advances continue over the next eight years, unmanned and 
autonomous, deep learning machines will likely see widespread adoption in both defense 
and commercial markets. As unmanned technology becomes increasingly salient across 
societies and militaries, “physical conflict could occur between unmanned systems. The 
opportunities for bloodless attacks could lower the threshold for conflict”13. China’s 
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technological adoption may rival that of the United States and could very well match the 
U.S. ability to project power regionally and globally. Russia’s military modernization, 
scheduled to be complete by the mid-2020’s14, includes fleets of modernized fixed-wing 
aircraft (about 700 aircraft in total), new Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, and 
improvements in ballistic missile technology; all of which could pose regional and global 
threats to the United States and its allies.  
Geopolitical movements, such as populism and isolationism, are likely to spread 
due to diverging security priorities, economic disparities and demographic diversity, 
especially across Western and Eastern Europe, prompting even more draconian 
immigration regulations and impacting economic and allied relationships. While this 
trend may slow or reverse within 4-8 years, the effects are likely to last for much longer. 
International institutions such as NATO and the EU will adapt to the change more slowly 
and it may take years for a stable rhythm to develop again. Policies emerging from these 
movements may prove so extreme that domestic movements against isolationism pick up 
momentum, the backlash against them may be more immediate and the West may see a 
rapid return to more liberal policies and a re-engagement with globalization, aiding in the 
share of emerging technologies and security cooperation. 
In order to meet the complex and overlapping challenges of this time period, the 
United States and its partners will likely look to develop forces that can rapidly and 
adaptively face a broad range of threats, across varying regions and within multiple 
domains. In the current zeitgeist, the United States may more critically assess the costs 
and benefits of direct intervention in foreign conflicts, thought it will likely still have to 
deploy forces to address a major crisis at some point while simultaneously managing 
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ongoing lower-level conflicts. The ability of the United States to credibly deter and if 
called upon, decisively defeat enemies and defend interests will very likely be tested over 
the next eight years. 
 
2025-2033 
By 2030, the world could look significantly different than it does today. There are 
several trends occurring now that will hit their peak in the 2025-2033 timeframe15, 
including economic growth in Asia, shift in power among traditional hegemons and 
changes in the nature of power and governance. While these trends are subject to some 
wax and wane, it is likely that the main threats facing the United States will emanate 
from the culmination of these major shifts in the security environment and that some risk 
factors seen in the previous timeframe will come to fruition in this period. 
            The projected growth of Asian economies is projected to overtake that of North 
America and Europe by 2030 in terms of GDP, population size, military spending and 
technical investment16. In doing so, the shift in the balance of power is likely to 
dramatically shift towards countries like China and India, whose existing relationships 
with countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Turkey will in turn raise their global 
presence. While the economies of the United States, Europe and Russia will not collapse 
in any dramatic fashion, their relative declines will be further exacerbated by strong 
growth in other regions. Influence, as a result, may wane. As these countries grow in 
economic strength, so will their ability to pursue technological advancements and 21st 
century manufacturing. 
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            Climate change consequences are projected to significantly worsen in terms of 
increased occurrences of extreme weather events, more extreme droughts in dry areas and 
significant and frequent flooding in wet areas. The Middle East, Northern Africa, 
Western Central Asia, Southern Europe, Southern Africa and the Southwest United States 
will be the most impacted by drought while coastal urban cities will face challenges with 
extreme weather resulting in coastal flooding and threats from storm wave damage. There 
is a possibility that extreme coastal weather will begin to drive coastal urban cities to 
expand inland, stressing agricultural areas needed to support urban populations and 
causing tensions among neighboring nations searching for area to expand. Resource 
demands will likely become a centerpiece of international tensions, creating opportunity 
for increased risk of state-to-state conflicts17. 
Technological breakthroughs will become more frequent and significant and 
public access to disruptive and potentially lethal technologies (precision-strike, cyber, 
chemical/biological terror, artificial intelligence) will become easier. As processing 
power and data storage becomes faster, easier and less expensive, governments and 
societies will be faced with the challenge of preventing the commoditization of classified 
military technology to non-state actors and individuals. These developments will likely 
change the face of terrorism, the beginnings of which were seen in the previous era (use 
of social media for propaganda and recruiting, drone warfare, etc.)18. 
As the international system becomes more fragmented by shifts in power and 
traditional means of cooperation are challenged, competition and conflict become more 
likely. It is unlikely, however, that devastating great power conflict (on the level of WWI 
or WWII) would take place, as the costs would be too high and the technology of the day 
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would increase the speed, discernment and precision of kinetic and non-kinetic effects 
necessary for state actors to achieve objectives, thereby reducing the magnitude of 
conflict as they affect civilian societies. However, the risk of conducting high-level 
conflicts with significant weaponry may rise. The proliferation of WMD is likely 
throughout this period and regional instability will only fuel desire for states to produce 
their own deterrent. As the risk for these types of conflict rises, so too does the risk of 
nuclear, chemical or biological employment in asymmetric ways. 
The role of the United States in this period is an uncertainty. If the U.S. economy 
remains relatively strong, the U.S. presence on the world stage will not decline 
significantly, barring any extreme policies that call for U.S. isolationism on a grand scale. 
U.S. innovation both commercially and militarily will likely continue but will face 
competition abroad. If the U.S. maintains its allied relationships, security cooperation 
with the West is likely to continue. The U.S. role in Asia will continue to be challenged 
and very well may be curtailed by a risen China. U.S. military forces will remain pre-
eminent in their training and ability to conduct warfare but will face challenges in terms 
of threats by proliferating technologies. U.S. force structure will likely need to be as, if 
not more, flexible as in the previous period and much more technologically capable. 
Nuclear weapons will likely remain a cornerstone of U.S. security and the improvement 
of missile defense capabilities is likely, as naval and air capabilities will provide the 
lion’s share of the projection of U.S. power. 
 
2033-2040 
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The world in this time period is unlikely to be more stable or peaceful and will 
almost certainly be characterized by instability19. The United States will likely remain the 
pre-eminent military power but will struggle to remain a leader politically and 
economically. While the continued rise of Asian countries, like China, is not a guarantee, 
intense competition between major powers, especially over resources, is highly likely. 
The convergence of globalization, population and emergence of new ideologies and 
proliferation of WMD is likely to create an environment in which conflict and 
confrontation, especially at lower levels, is a common occurrence. 
            Perhaps the biggest threat facing this period is the proliferation of WMD. Not 
only will proliferation generate instability and shift the global balance of military power, 
terror groups are more likely to acquire and use nuclear, chemical and biological 
materials in significant payloads20. Increasing cyber capabilities “directed at critical 
infrastructures, including space assets”21, complicate this threat picture. As these 
technologies and materials spread, the United States and partner nations will have a 
harder time developing successful deterrence policies and strategies. Terror groups are 
unlikely to hesitate to use devastating WMD capabilities if acquired. As states and non-
state actors continue to clash in this period, it is highly likely that those conflicts will 
exhibit combined capabilities, including WMD, conventional, irregular and high-end 
asymmetric capabilities. 
            The United States will face extended years of instability in an environment in 
which the traditional balance of power is almost guaranteed to shift dramatically. As 
such, the United States must be able to respond with both agility and flexibility while 
maintaining strong commitments to U.S. interests, allies and friends. The United States 
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must also be prepared to protect and defend innovation in both the military and 
commercial realms in an attempt to remain the pre-eminent military power. U.S. force 
structure will likely look drastically different by 2040 than it does today. Naval 
capabilities, unmanned and autonomous technologies, superior air dominance, superior 
cyber and space capabilities will own the military battlespace. 
State-sponsored terrorism is likely to continue or even rise as regional conflicts 
become more concentrated and frequent. In this event, the likelihood of a non-state actor 
or terrorist organization acquiring WMD, as well as the expertise and technological 
knowledge to employ it, may rise dramatically. While the employment of nuclear 
weapons on a large scale remains unlikely, the employment of one or two in isolated 
fashion is well within the realm of possibility. Analysts believe that conflicts in this era 
are likely to include multiple forms of warfare with an increased risk of nuclear 
employment22. The risk for nuclear employment to create EMP effects is higher in this 
era as “countries with nuclear weapons could be tempted to explode a nuclear device to 
wipe out their opponent’s ability to maintain connectivity…In this instance, nuclear first 
use would not be used to harm humans as much as to deny opponents use of electronic 
systems. Space, ocean and near coastal bottlenecks could be areas of nuclear use with 
little human collateral damage”23.  
The United States will be forced to confront an emerging threat environment 
“characterized by a wide-spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear 
powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups and terrorist organizations that now have 
access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the next 15 
 23 
years” and will have the capability to “place the risk of EMP attack and adverse 
consequences on the U.S. to a level that is not acceptable”24. 
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CHAPTER 2: U.S. EXPECTATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND 
EMPLOYMENT WITHIN MODERN WARFARE 
The role of nuclear weapons has changed decade to decade and over time their 
role has been reduced dramatically. From the height of the Cold War, when nuclear 
weapons represented the bulk of U.S. security, to today where nuclear weapons have a 
reduced role as a matter of policy. In 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration, 
the President gave a speech in Prague outlining his administration’s views of nuclear 
weapons policy and efforts to begin to bring about a world without nuclear weapons. This 
was the beginning of what many saw as a utopian approach to nuclear weapons, in spite 
of the challenge of proliferation and modernizing nuclear weapons doctrines.  
In the Prague speech, the President vowed to press the Senate to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security 
policy and strengthen nonproliferation regimes designed to curb the spread of nuclear 
weapons technology and information, the most important of which being the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)25. While nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone 
of U.S. security and power projection, their prominence would dwindle.  
It was in the same speech that President Obama identified nuclear terrorism as a 
real threat, stating “terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one…We must ensure 
that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme 
threat to global security. One terrorist with a nuclear weapon could unleash massive 
destruction”26. It is not clear if the threat of nuclear EMP was a consideration of the 
Obama administration in classifying the threat of terrorist employment of a nuclear 
weapon the most immediate and extreme threat to security. Nonetheless, terrorist 
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employment of a nuclear weapon was at the forefront of both the administration and 
security experts’ minds. However, nuclear weapons have not traditionally been used as a 
deterrent for terrorist attacks in the past, mainly due to the high number of civilian 
casualties that would ultimately result from the employment of a nuclear weapon against 
the territory inhabited by a terrorist organization. As such, the decision to broadly reduce 
the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy is not entirely surprising.  
For the remaining seven years of the Obama administration, the policy of a 
reduced role for nuclear weapons continued. The President successfully negotiated the 
New START treaty in 2010, enforcing new limits on nuclear warheads and missiles, 
launchers and bombers. While there is nuance in those limits, the reductions were 
significant and reflected an enduring desire to continue the traditions of arms control 
following the end of the Cold War. The key provision in New START centered on the 
freedom of both Russia and the United States to organize their nuclear force structures 
however they wished, as long as they adhered to the limits imposed by the treaty. In 
doing so, each state was free to create a force structure that best represented their 
strategic goals. Today, the United States maintains a triad, emphasizing a capability to 
support forward presence in allied nations and in maritime environments but has 
struggled in recent years to provide sufficient funding for much-need modernization on 
aspects of each leg of the triad. As budget pressures continue, the Trump Administration 
will face challenges to funding expensive, existing programs like the Ohio-class 
replacement submarines (recently named the Columbia-class) and the B-21 Long-Range 
Strategic Bomber, while simultaneously awarding funding for new programs like the 
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program (the Minuteman replacement) and the Long-
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Range Standoff Missile (LRSO). Key leaders in the Pentagon27 and Congress28 have 
expressed commitment to funding these programs, as they are crucial to the credibility of 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, however with constrained defense budgets the fight over 
funding and affordability will be fierce and is, as of yet, unsettled. 
While the United States struggles to allocate the necessary funds for its nuclear 
modernization, Russia’s significant and expensive nuclear modernization program, 
expected to last through at least 2024, is well underway. The Russian Federation has 
focused on phasing out Soviet-era systems and replacing them with more modern, 
effective capabilities. The ICBM force structure will be completely modernized with 
maximized warhead loads by 2021, the old Delta-class SSBNs will be replaced with eight 
planned Borei-class SSBNs, and the nuclear-capable bomber fleet will feature a new sub-
sonic, low-observable long-range bomber by the mid-2020’s29. The modernization of the 
Russian nuclear arsenal points to the commitment they have in maintaining a nuclear 
deterrent far into the future.  
The Russians are fairly forthcoming about nuclear weapons strategy in their 
military doctrine. While the United States generally separates nuclear policy from 
broader military strategies in official documents, the Russians include their nuclear 
doctrine as a vital component of the larger military strategy. In 2014, the Russian policy 
regarding nuclear weapons read as follows: 
“The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction 
against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian 
Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the 
state is in jeopardy”30. 
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This policy does not rule out first-use31 of nuclear weapons but frames the policy 
within fairly tight parameters. Though the Obama administration explored transitioning to 
a no-first-use policy in the last year of the administration, they ultimately decided against 
doing so. Many experts in the field argued against it, citing concerns over possibly 
undermining the deterrence strategy. Russian nuclear doctrine is much more belligerent 
and prominent within the broader military strategy than that of the United States.  
The Russian Federation has demonstrated a willingness to engage in asymmetric 
warfare and is believed to include nuclear weapons within their asymmetric warfare 
strategies. Even as the Russians scaled down their nuclear arsenal following the end of the 
Cold War, they deliberately maintained the ability to employ nuclear EMP. Dr. Lowell 
Wood, in his testimony before Congress on Russian nuclear strategy and EMP stated, 
“EMP strike component exists today in the Russian strategic order-of-battle, moreover 
likely at its maximum Cold War strength. I very confidently predict that it will be one of 
the last features of Soviet strategic nuclear weaponry to be retired from the Russian 
strategic force structure”32. It is highly unlikely that any Russian employment of nuclear 
EMP would happen independent from other asymmetric warfare tactics such as “cyber-
attacks, sabotage, and kinetic attacks against the national electric grid and other critical 
infrastructures – a decisive new way of warfare described by Russian experts as a 
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’”33. Further analysis of the history of Russian EMP and its 
potential asymmetric employment is explored further in following chapters. 
While the United States has dealt with a nuclear Russia for decades, it must also 
take into account younger nuclear powers (China, Iran, and North Korea) that pose 
deterrence challenges to the United States and its allies. China’s nuclear program has 
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been active since its first test in October 1964 and has consistently operated under a no-
first-use policy, asserting that the Chinese nuclear arsenal is a minimum deterrent against 
nuclear attacks34. The U.S. State Department believes that China’s missile arsenal 
includes short-range ballistic missiles, ICBMs, SLBMs and possibly cruise missiles, all 
capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads – and all capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons to high-altitude to produce EMP effects.  
Information about China’s nuclear arsenal is limited but its policies on no-first-
use and nuclear restraint are well documented. Chinese defense white papers consistently 
reiterate China’s “unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-
free zones” and there is “no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely 
adopted and persistently upheld for half a century”35. However, some experts believe that 
China views the employment of nuclear weapons to produce EMP effects an 
unconventional attack, rather than a strategic one, and therefore believes the United 
States may not view such employment as crossing the nuclear threshold36. Like Russia, 
China has also invested in asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber, and may view nuclear 
EMP as a broader asymmetric warfare tool. Considering the regional tensions between 
China and the United States, especially regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, it is 
far more likely that China would choose to employ nuclear EMP regionally in an attempt 
to halt U.S. intervention, rather than over the U.S. homeland. 
As rogue states, North Korea and Iran pose special challenges to the United States 
in the modern warfare environment. Both have active nuclear weapons programs and 
advancing missile capabilities that are more than capable of producing EMP effects 
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regionally and may be capable of reaching the skies above the United States to produce 
intended EMP effects. Both are also conventionally inferior to the United States and gain 
little by engaging in a conventional conflict in which they are sure to be decisively 
defeated. Asymmetric use of a nuclear weapon may not only provide states like Iran and 
North Korea the upper hand, it may postpone or prevent a devastating U.S defeat 
altogether.  
North Korea has often stated its adversarial position towards the U.S. and though 
Iran has cooperated with the United States on some nuclear weapons issues, the 
relationship between the two remains tense and unstable. The nuclear agreement between 
the United States and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), went into 
effect in January 2016, lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. It requires that Iran 
comply with all United Nations security resolutions regarding the Iranian missile 
program. UN security resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA and “called upon” Iran to not 
undertake any further action on the missile program (ballistic or cruise), including 
launches, as well as endorsed previous security resolutions aimed at curbing Iranian 
testing of missile technology37. However, Iran has tested missile technology as recently 
as January 29, 2017, demonstrating an enduring desire to possess sophisticated missile 
capabilities, the vast majority of which would be capable of delivering a nuclear payload 
at high-altitude to produce EMP effects.  
North Korea poses a slightly different challenge. It is extremely difficult to 
ascertain exact numbers or facts about the status of North Korea’s nuclear program. 
However, it is believed to be somewhat sophisticated, possibly including at least one 
thermonuclear device. North Korea has conducted five tests of nuclear weapons in total 
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and a far larger number of missile tests, though they have enjoyed mixed success. 
Regardless, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are only growing and they have been clear 
about their intentions to target South Korea and the West Coast of the United States. 
Even if targeting of the West Coast is not yet technically feasible, employment of a 
nuclear weapon in theater would be devastating to U.S. forces and allies in the region and 
would likely alter the regional balance of security permanently. To date, the United States 
and South Korea have maintained deterrence in the region through security 
demonstrations and exercises, however a nuclear EMP attack in theater may render these 
types of operations incredibly difficult, if not impossible.  
The nuclear security environment of today, from a U.S. perspective, largely 
focuses on the threat from employment of nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland, 
U.S. forces in theater and U.S. allies and friends. However, it makes little-to-no mention 
of asymmetric uses of nuclear weapons like that of nuclear EMP. Perhaps, this is due to 
the fact that nuclear EMP fell out of public consciousness following the end of the Cold 
War, or that more prescient threats became more urgent within the current security 
environment, or perhaps that with an increasingly sophisticated technological 
environment, the U.S. believes that an actor would not need to resort to the employment 
of a nuclear weapon to produce effects similar to EMP. Whatever the answer, it is clear 
that U.S. deterrence strategy is not focused on the threat of nuclear EMP by state 
adversaries, rogue states or terrorist organizations but on more traditional nuclear 
deterrence challenges.   
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CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR EMP – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Nuclear electromagnetic pulse was, in many ways, an unexpected discovery. In 
the early years of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were racing to 
produce large arsenals of nuclear weapons and testing of those weapons was happening 
frequently. In 1961 and 1962, both countries began to test nuclear weapons at high-
altitude, during which they observed the first effects from the electromagnetic pulse 
produced by the detonation of the weapon. Only a total of 20 high-altitude nuclear 
weapons tests were conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States, during 
which EMP effects were observed but not deliberately sought out38. The Soviet Union 
conducted seven such nuclear weapons tests above their own territory of Kazakhstan 
between 1961 and 1962, all of which demonstrated EMP effects such as observable 
damage to transformers and collapsed critical electric infrastructure. The weapons tested 
were mainly “low-yield warheads, at least one probably an Enhanced Radiation Warhead 
that emitted large quantities of gamma rays that generate the E1 EMP electromagnetic 
shockwave”39.  
The most prominent of the U.S. high-altitude tests was in July 1962, named 
“Starfish Prime”. The nuclear weapon was 1.45 megatons40 and was detonated at a height 
of 400 kilometers above Johnston Atoll in the Northern Pacific Ocean. In Hawaii, almost 
1,400 kilometers away, the “effects were bizarre and almost entirely unanticipated.  One 
effect was an electromagnetic pulse, but nobody knew it was going to be anywhere nearly 
as large it proved to be.  They had all this data and they didn’t understand very much of 
it, including the EMPs that had been observed and the effects produced…all kinds of 
electrical disturbances were seen over 1000 kilometers away in Oahu”41. The EMP 
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produced by the detonation “interrupted radio broadcasts, caused streetlights to 
malfunction and burglar alarms to sound and resulted in electronic failures across the 
islands”42. The night sky above Hawaii lit up with thermonuclear glow and about one 
third of the satellites in low-earth orbit were damaged or destroyed43. Figure 1 
demonstrates the path of the EMP the further it travels from the site of detonation and 
shows how altitude has a direct correlation with effect. Had Starfish Prime been 
detonated at a lower altitude, the EMP effects would have covered a much smaller area 
and likely would not have affected electrical systems in Hawaii at all.   
 
Figure 1. EMP Range of the Starfish Prime Nuclear Test44 
 
As these effects were observed in subsequent tests by both the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the scientific nuances of producing the desired effects became clearer. 
A high-yield nuclear weapon detonated between 40 and 500 kilometers above the earth’s 
surface (exo-atmospheric) is by far the most effective. Ground-burst nuclear weapons 
produce EMP at thousands of volts per meter but only over short distances. The other 
effects of ground-burst nuclear detonations typically outweigh any EMP effects. High-
altitude nuclear detonations, however, produce extremely strong EMP over very wide 
distances with no physical threat to humans from the fireball, fallout or blast effect. The 
radiation produced from the burst will not interact with other atoms until they reach the 
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top level of the atmosphere, causing them to excite and travel along the earth’s magnetic 
field at an extremely accelerated rate over a vast area. Electromagnetic waves create 
extremely high electric field strengths, producing thousands of volts in a split second 
pulse, overwhelming electrical systems, especially unprotected equipment. The greater 
the altitude, the more widespread the area effected and the greater the likelihood that low-
earth orbit satellites experience interference or are damaged45.  
Figure 2. Area Effected by EMP Determined by Height of Burst46 
Two types of basic damage occur in electrical systems due to electromagnetic 
pulse: physical damage, such as short-out and burning, requiring replacement or repair 
and operational upset requiring reboot or full reset of the system47. This type of damage 
was observed in civilian infrastructure, such as traffic lights and electricity to homes, and 
communications infrastructure, such as radio broadcasts and telephone lines during both 
the Johnston Atoll tests and the Soviet tests above Kazakhstan. Once affected, electrical 
systems could take days to repair or months to replace. The Soviet Union, after 
witnessing these types of effects in Kazakhstan, began to develop strategies that included 
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the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland, with the goal of 
“paralyz[ing] our military systems, as well as civilian critical infrastructure. The Russians 
were also hoping it would interfere with emergency action messages to all forces, 
including ballistic nuke submarines”48.  
The United States developed Cold War national capabilities, such as the Ground-
Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)49, to protect communication networks from EMP 
effects and worked to harden the nuclear weapons infrastructure in the event that the 
Soviet Union would attempt to damage or destroy the United States’ ability to 
communicate or respond to Soviet aggression. During the Cold War, it was assumed that 
if nuclear EMP were to be employed, it would be done in an effort to cripple the ability 
of the other to respond before a devastating second strike. However, because there were 
so few high-altitude nuclear weapons tests and the numbers of nuclear weapons on each 
side so high, there was no guarantee that an EMP attack could cripple the whole of one 
side’s nuclear arsenal, and therefore not guarantee the prevention of a retaliatory strike. It 
was also clear that any employment of a nuclear weapon would result in nuclear 
retaliation, not just a ground- or air-burst. The deterrence that governed the battlespace of 
the Cold War was fairly straight forward and understood by both sides. The guarantee of 
mutual destruction combined with even a small doubt in the capability was strong enough 
to prevent an EMP attack by either side.  
However, even in the Post-Cold War environment, concerns over EMP remained 
fresh in the minds of Russian strategic leadership. The Norwegian rocket launch incident 
in 1995 was interpreted by the Russians as a U.S. SLBM launch designed to “take out the 
general staff and paralyze the forces to enable a surprise attack. They would expect a 
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single missile from a close location. This was a week after they lost the battle of Grozny. 
They thought, if the roles were reversed and the U.S. military had suffered a defeat in the 
Cold War, [the Russians] would complete the process and at some point deliver a coup de 
grace against the United States…they were waiting to see if the U.S. would launch a 
surprise nuclear attack to finish off Russia and finalize its Cold War victory”50. While the 
United States largely moved on from the Cold War and has, by all measures, thought of 
nuclear EMP as a threat of that era ever since, the Russians have not. Scientists of the 
Russian Federation have identified nuclear weapons as unique in their ability to create 
widespread EMP. Efforts to create conventional weapons that have the same effects have 
been challenging: “It is practically impossible for non-nuclear means to concentrate 
energy that is in any way comparable with that of a nuclear burst”51. As Russian 
asymmetric strategies of war developed and modernized to include cyber-attacks, 
information campaigns and sabotage campaigns (small arms, bombs), the strategy for 
employment of nuclear EMP evolved simultaneously. In 2004, Russian Major General 
Vladimir Belous wrote the following in a public article: 
 “Space-based and ground facilities of the information-reconnaissance system, 
without which the missile defense system will prove to be ‘blind, are 
especially vulnerable in this sense [EMP]… ‘blinding’ of enemy territory by 
disabling his electronic and power network is also possible. American 
specialists determined that in case a large nuclear charger were detonated at an 
altitude of hundreds of kilometers above the geographic center of the United 
States, the State of Nebraska, a powerful electromagnetic pulse will disable 
electronic and power systems on the territory of the entire country for a 
certain time”52. 
 
The same year, Russian Captain, First Rank, H. Rezyapov wrote an article entitled 
“Asymmetric Threats to the National Security of the United States” in which he 
postulated, “Such a blast would simultaneously take out of action almost all of the 
 36 
satellites orbiting above the United States… and affect up to 90 percent of the territory of 
the United States by the action of its EMP”53. Russia has not ceased to incorporate 
nuclear EMP into its strategy and finds great value in the capability outside of the Cold 
War era.  
The Post-Cold War world not only saw disparities in the way Russia and the 
United States viewed nuclear weapons and their employment, it experienced significant 
growth in the number of states which possess nuclear weapons. U.S. allies like the U.K. 
and France, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea all became states capable of 
devastating destruction through the use of nuclear weapons, and each state’s strategy for 
those weapons differs depending on the security situation in which they operate. For the 
purposes of this analysis, China, Iran and North Korea are the focus, though any of the 
remaining states could employ nuclear weapons for EMP effect and greatly influence 
their own strategic situations.  
The U.S. Department of Defense reports that China has included nuclear EMP as 
part of its larger asymmetric strategy since 1999, though has spent more time pursuing 
conventional directed energy and electronic warfare weapons as well as exploring space 
and counter-space capabilities, which it views as inevitable factors of future asymmetric 
warfare54. Technical papers on EMP appear regularly in Chinese technical journals, such 
as one published in a Chinese military digest in 2002, which stated “EMP warheads will 
make it much easier to cross the nuclear threshold”55. The Taiwanese government, as a 
possible target of nuclear EMP, has been writing about Chinese EMP capabilities since at 
least 1992. One such report in October 2003, reported that “China is engaged in 
quantitative production and deployment of EMP micro nuclear warheads”56. According 
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to a Wall Street Journal article in the same year, “China recently published an article on 
EMP in a Chinese-language technical journal. To make sure the U.S. got the message, the 
article appeared in English’”57. Though China retains its commitment to a no-first-use 
policy, it is clear that as the Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons employment has 
shifted over time, especially in terms of the employment of a nuclear weapon for EMP 
effects. In the eyes of Chinese defense strategists, nuclear EMP “will make it much easier 
to cross the nuclear threshold”58. 
Though Iran has not directly stated an intention to acquire EMP capabilities, it is 
widely believed to be actively pursuing the capabilities needed as part of its nuclear and 
missile programs. The JCPOA succeeded in slowing the Iranian nuclear program, 
delaying it about a decade. However, the agreement has done little to slow the progress of 
Iran’s missile program. Some experts believe that “the military utility of Iran’s ballistic 
missiles is limited because of their poor accuracy”59 however, the capabilities required to 
successfully employ nuclear EMP do not require accuracy, “it just has to go up.  It's well 
within the capability of even an earlier Scud missile, of which thousands have been 
produced – it just has to have nuclear weapon on top”60. This does not require re-entry 
capabilities or sophisticated targeting systems. Iran’s missile testing so far has 
demonstrated their ability to launch “their versions of Scuds off of the Caspian Sea - not 
from land, but from the sea - and launched them over land.  And we’ve also seen them 
launch missiles that have gone up and apparently exploded near their highest altitude – 
when you put those two ideas together – that is an EMP attack”61. As a rogue state, Iran is 
notoriously vague and secretive about its capabilities and intentions. It is difficult to 
determine whether nuclear EMP is truly within the offensive strategies of Iran however, 
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if desired, it would not be a technical stretch to accomplish. Finally, Iran’s history of 
state-sponsored terrorism is especially troubling in terms of nuclear EMP and will be 
explored and analyzed in further chapters in the context of the modern threat to the 
United States.  
North Korea, as previously analyzed, has tested nuclear weapons for over a 
decade and is well aware of the ability to produce EMP effects, especially against U.S. 
and allied forces in theater. South Korea has long been concerned about the threat of 
nuclear EMP from North Korea and has published many articles in academic and security 
journals concerning the threat to low-earth-orbit satellites above the region as well as the 
risk of ensuing panic among U.S. forces in the region62 if or when damage is done to 
forward-deployed U.S. capabilities. Though there is little data, much like Iran, to 
concretely determine that nuclear EMP is among the capabilities North Korea is 
attempting to acquire, recent rocket and missile tests into the Sea of Japan63 show that 
North Korea may indeed be capable of inflicting nuclear harm or nuclear EMP in theater 
on U.S. military assets in Japan or South Korea. 
Nuclear weapons have changed little since the Cold War but the nature and 
strategy of their employment, especially in terms of nuclear EMP has evolved. While 
asymmetric warfare is not a new concept, the frequency with which it is undertaken and 
the use of the capabilities it involves are purely modern. For many of the states discussed, 
the employment of nuclear EMP is not thought of or strategized as a singular event, but 
as part of a larger whole. To best understand why this is so and why states and non-state 
actors may find nuclear EMP appealing, one must first understand the effects nuclear 
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EMP would have on the United States, its infrastructure, military capabilities and 
citizens.  
Modern Day EMP Vulnerabilities 
Older technology, such as the previously mentioned vacuum tubes of the 1960’s, 
is “one million times less vulnerable”64 than today’s technology and effects were still 
observed more than 1,400 kilometers away from the Starfish Prime detonation. To best 
understand the utility of nuclear EMP, one must first understand the vulnerabilities 
inherent in today’s electronically-dependent world. The United States has long been 
known as an innovative nation, one which has experienced leaps and bounds of 
technological advancement. Today, the United States is more technologically advanced 
than ever before and electronics, telecommunication systems and electrical systems form 
the cornerstones of a thriving U.S. society (transportation, banking, water and agricultural 
production and dissemination, communications, etc). However, these critical 
infrastructures within the United States are very poorly protected, not just from events 
like nuclear EMP but also from natural disasters or terrorist attacks. These vulnerabilities 
are well-known among adversaries and both invite and reward attacks like cyber, 
sabotage and nuclear EMP; an adversarial “cheap shot”, if you will. 
In 2001, the Commission to Assess the Electromagnetic Pulse Threat was 
established to study the vulnerabilities of critical U.S. infrastructure systems to nuclear 
EMP attack. The commission evaluated all aspects of U.S. infrastructure as they are 
dependent upon one another to function in a meaningful way. What the commission 
found was that this dependency created significant challenges for recovery after a nuclear 
EMP attack. In 2008, the Commission again assessed the critical infrastructure of the 
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United States and found it to be extremely vulnerable to the effects of nuclear EMP, in 
such a way that any devastating attack is considered an existential threat to the United 
States. Below are the elements of U.S. critical infrastructure and how each may be 
affected by nuclear EMP.  
Electrical Power 
      The U.S. electric grid is composed of networks of local electricity supplies, with 
large-capacity electric transmission hubs few and far between. In such a setup, even small 
upsets in the system can cause functional collapses and large disturbances like “EMP-
level effects could degrade or collapse 70 percent of the country’s electrical service in 
one instant”65. The system is designed to withstand disturbances like lightning strikes, but 
in limited areas, not overwhelming, instantaneous high-voltage pulses across vast swaths 
of the country, which is why the infrastructure relies on a strategy of “islanding”. 
Figure 3. U.S. Electrical Grid Interconnections66 
 41 
      When a portion of the system is damaged or interrupted, the other islands continue to 
operate based on geographic locations of the larger transmission hubs. However, in the 
event of an EMP attack, numerous (if not all) islands would be degraded or destroyed 
simultaneously. Though peripheral islands, if functioning, are capable of restarting those 
in the immediate vicinity, the process would require restarts in rounds from the outside of 
the damaged area, in. This process would take weeks, if not months, during which the 
affected population would remain without power. The Commission report argued that 
with the current setup, the only effective way to restart the system would be through 
“black start generation”67: the process of using hydroelectric, geothermal and 
independent diesel generators to restart the grid. These energy producers are not as 
common in the U.S. system and the process would still take significant time. Another 
complicating element is the overarching need for restart processes to take place. The 
ability to repair and restart electrical power systems requires communication systems, 
operational finance systems and transportation systems which need reliable, continuous 
fuel supply. Fuel supply, communications, transportation and finance infrastructures will 
all be affected in the event of a strong EMP attack. Restoring those systems is not only 
essential to the ability to restore power but essential to the quick recovery of civilian 
order. 
Electricity is produced and distributed in various ways in the United States, some 
more resilient to nuclear EMP than others. Coal-fired generation plants are generally the 
most durable and normally have on-site fuel storage, so in the event of an emergency, 
they can produce energy, if only for a short amount of time. Natural gas-fired turbines are 
more modern and therefore more vulnerable. Nuclear plants, which represent 20% of the 
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country’s electrical generation, have their own safe shut down systems that go into effect 
in the event of system upsets – their ability to shut down safely is key during EMP but 
they will be unavailable as generation sources for months following an EMP attack68. 
Hydroelectric power is durable against EMP and produces significant generation but does 
so unevenly in terms of its geographic availability. Hydroelectric power would be key in 
recovering service for areas along the coast or dams of large rivers. Hydroelectric power 
is likely the most helpful in a black start generation process because their geographic 
locations allow restart to happen from the periphery of the grid.  
Electrical power is the number one concern for loss during an EMP attack, as 
numerous critical aspects of civilian life and the functioning of government at all levels 
depend upon an operational power grid. A single EMP attack “may be strong enough to 
seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid in the geographic 
area of EMP exposure effective instantaneously…Should significant parts of the electric 
power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes 
that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die 
for lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban 
communities. In fact, the Commission is deeply concerned that such impacts are likely in 
the event of an EMP attack unless practical steps are taken to provide protection for 
critical elements of the electric system and for rapid restoration of electric power, 
particularly to essential services”69. The good news is that protecting, or hardening, key 
generation capabilities in strategic geographic locations within the system would be 
enough to create a network capable of quick restart in the event of a devastating attack. 
Hardening and protection of key capabilities also contributes to deterrence of an attack in 
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the first place. If it becomes clear that the United States has taken significant steps to 
protect critical infrastructure from damage or disruption, the risk v. reward calculus shifts 
and an actor may not believe that an EMP attack would have the desired effects but still 
prompt a U.S. response.   
Telecommunications 
The immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 best illustrate, on 
a smaller scale, what may happen in the aftermath of an EMP attack in terms of the 
disruption or loss of telecommunications networks. Personal telecommunications, the 
vast majority over cell phone networks, were disrupted up and down the east coast simply 
due to call volume which overwhelmed the system and caused cascading failures. Radio 
communications between first responders were patchy and communication at ground zero 
was confusing and incomplete. Perhaps the most alarming failure in communications 
networks was at the federal level. According to the staff report of the September 11th 
Commission, the Defense Department’s National Military Command Center initiated a 
conference call about the ongoing situation but had trouble including the FAA, who had 
information about the hijackings: “Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA in 
this teleconference, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone 
numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of FAA on the 
conference, to provide an update on the hijackings. The FAA did not join the call until 
10:17”70. By the time a complete picture of the hijackings was garnered through 
information sharing of the FAA and DoD, the Pentagon had been attacked as well.  
Though communications infrastructure was not directly targeted on September 11th, the 
event highlighted difficulties and vulnerabilities within the telecommunications system as 
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well as its connection to other aspects of the national security architecture. The 
interruption in communications affected key financial markets and posed liquidity risks 
for U.S. finances. Business continuity and financial stability are essential in the recovery 
effort and are closely tied to U.S. national security. In the event of an EMP attack 
targeted to destroy these systems, the results could be much more devastating and long-
lasting. Unprotected communication within the affected area would be impossible and 
operational areas would be severely degraded due to overwhelming call volume. 
Concerning federal communications, the Commission reports of 2004 and 2008 
recommended that the federal government ensure the Government Emergency 
Telecommunications System is operational and protected, as the four types of 
communications within it are unique in their ability to withstanding EMP71. Wireline 
communications are durable but may be degraded within the affected area; wireless 
communications are likely to be destroyed and inoperable (unless they are powered down 
at the time of attack); the radio communication sub-system is not widespread but where it 
is connected to antennas, power lines and telephone lines it is highly vulnerable. Radio 
communications not connected to those assets at the time of attack will likely be 
operational; and low-earth orbit communications satellites may be degraded or inoperable 
from radiation damage depending on the altitude and magnitude of the detonation72. 
In April 2015, as part of the government’s effort to “safeguard the command’s 
sensitive sensors and servers from a potential EMP attack”73, NORAD decided to move 
critical assets, like servers, sensors and communications equipment, back into the bunker 
at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, the Cold War cavern built in the 1960’s to safeguard 
sensitive military communications and technology from a Soviet EMP attack. Raytheon 
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was awarded a $700 million, 10-year contract to provide sustainment and maintenance 
services to “help the military perform accurate, timely and unambiguous warning and 
attack assessment of air, missile and space threats”74. The facility was closed down about 
a decade ago after the military deemed the threat low enough to move the operations to 
Peterson Air Force Base nearby. It is possible that this is a first step in protecting 
sensitive communications as tensions with the Russians are once again on the rise.  
Banking and Finance 
The American economy, one of the largest and strongest in the world, depends 
upon electrical systems to run effectively and globally. The financial services industry is 
comprised of a network of systems that process instruments of monetary value (deposits, 
loans, funds transfers, savings, etc.) through banks and depository institutions, including 
the Federal Reserve, investment companies, and industry utilities such as the NYSE. 
Without functioning electricity and computer systems, the industry would be crippled. 
These are the means and resources that provide the U.S. population with the ability to 
buy food, fuel and essential goods and services. Without it, the chances for chaos to erupt 
in a short amount of time are very high. Of all the institutions affected by EMP, banking 
and finance come second only to the electrical grid. There is a direct link between the 
economic security of the nation and national security. The EMP Commission reports 
identified the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Department of the Treasury as the agencies responsible for ensuring there are mitigation 
tactics and recovery strategies in place for events like EMP75. Even if recovery takes 
weeks, this is one sector which must recover fully.  
Fuel and Energy Infrastructure 
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The transport and dissemination of fuel and energy depends upon electronic 
control systems, real-time data flows, communications and process control systems. 
Operation of oil refineries and other fuel production technology requires an operational 
electric system. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, lack of access to fuel further 
exacerbates the challenge of restarting the electric grid and providing transportation to the 
civilian population, who may be attempting to leave affected areas. Access to fuel also 
impacts the ability of the government to respond to crises stemming from EMP attacks, 
such as food and water shortages and medical emergencies.  
Transportation 
Transportation in the United States occurs in several forms: rail, road, water and 
air. A nuclear EMP attack would affect all four of these, but in different ways. 
Transportation services in the United States are increasingly reliant on information 
technology and public information networks and disruption even at the local or regional 
level can have national effects. The significant degradation of the transportation 
infrastructure is likely in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack76. This would include 
wide-area gridlock (traffic light malfunctions, temporary or unrecoverable engine 
shutdown), the cessation of rail transportation (lost communication with rail traffic 
control), air traffic grounded (lost air traffic control) and port closures (commercial 
power and cargo hauling capabilities inoperable).  
There are mixed reports about the risk to airliners in flight during an EMP attack. 
While it the effects of EMP on airliners has not been widely tested, it is believed that 
more modern airline designs, such as the Boeing 777, may experience failure in flight in 
the aftermath of EMP because of increased reliance on computerized technology in the 
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newer models77. If this were to in fact occur, immediate deaths from EMP would climb 
dramatically due to the number of airlines in flight over the United States at any given 
time. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, the U.S. government and the FAA must find a 
way for planes in flight to land safely, without an operable air traffic control. DHS and 
the FAA will need to coordinate extended no-fly periods and perform assessments on the 
air traffic control systems to determine how quickly it can be recovered78. While the 
airline industry is not critical to the survival of the United States, the impact on civilian 
life and economic health of the nation would be extreme and long-lasting.  
Railroad transportation is designed to operate under high stress but they often 
require ample warning time, in the case of severe weather, for example. There will be 
little to no warning for an EMP attack, giving railroad operators no time to prepare for 
delays, prioritize shipments and enhance safety. Long delays and disruption on railroads 
would likely cause further disruption in the distribution of food, water and fuel during a 
crucial time when the civilian population will be in need.  
Similar to airliners, the effect of EMP on vehicles is debated. Newer model cars 
with onboard computers are likely to be more affected than older models and cars 
powered off at the time of the electromagnetic pulse are likely to be completely operable, 
regardless of the technology inside. However, the impact of EMP on vehicles does not 
just affect the mobility of civilians, it affects the transportation of vital resources like 
food, water and emergency personnel. Without viable transportation, the ability of 
distributors to get food out to grocery stores from regional warehouses would be severely 
impacted. Grocery stores typically stock enough fresh food for three to five days while 
warehouses stock about a month’s worth79. Panicked populations are likely to buy out 
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grocery stores in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack, adding to concerns about 
food distribution and civil order. The Stafford Act80, an act passed to authorize the 
President to ensure that emergency mass feeding and distribution is able to occur 
efficiently, could be amended to provide for plans to protect, ration and deliver food from 
both government and private sector stockpiles and provide plans for distribution in the 
event of a national emergency. The Department of Homeland Security would act as the 
lead agency responsible for coordination and dissemination of food assistance in 
partnership with the Departments of Agriculture and Defense. Similarly, the distribution 
of water would be challenging. Though water facilities are designed to be protected from 
threats by terrorists and natural disasters, EMP is not currently listed as a threat 
consideration for water treatment or distribution facilities. Lack of access to food and 
water combined with limited access to transportation could result in civil disorder, such 
as widespread looting and crime. 
Though employment of nuclear EMP does not typically result in immediate 
civilian casualties, weeks or months without proper access to food, water or electricity 
could very well result in widespread civilian harm or death. Emergency services would 
be in high-demand from the beginning of the crisis and throughout the recovery. 
However, the technology relied upon by emergency personnel, such as mobile radio 
communications equipment, commercial telephone networks and civil power networks, is 
likely to be degraded or destroyed by EMP which would severely impact response time, 
logistics and critical health operations. Increased demand for emergency services will 
overwhelm any operational systems, introducing further complications.  
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Government, Military and Space Assets 
Maintaining continuity of government in the immediate aftermath of a crisis such 
as EMP is priority number one. Secure communications between the President and senior 
officials must remain intact in order to provide stability to the public and command 
responsive actions if any are to be ordered. National capabilities were designed and 
fielded during the Cold War but may need to be updated to reflect the complexity and 
sophistication of today’s government and military structure. Current policy requires 
protection from EMP effects on U.S. strategic forces and command and control81. 
Certifying and maintaining the credibility of U.S. strategic forces is challenging and, as 
observed by the Commission in 2004, EMP protections on such systems have 
experienced “relaxed discipline”82; the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces in particular 
may have become an “acceptable risk” post-Cold War83. However, for U.S. strategic 
forces to contribute to deterrence of an EMP attack, the ability of forces to withstand 
EMP effects and reliably respond or retaliate must be certified regularly and with public 
acknowledgment. 
U.S. general purpose forces are consistently technologically superior to those of 
the vast majority of the world. Advanced warfighting and joint combat operations depend 
upon technologically advanced computing, information flow and superior 
communications, all of which are powered by advanced electronics and space-borne 
assets. This highly superior technology is extremely vulnerable to the effects of EMP, 
making them an attractive target for asymmetric deployment of nuclear weapons against 
U.S. forces and infrastructure terrestrially and in space. Low-earth orbit satellites that 
enable up- and down-link capabilities, GPS and PNT, remote sensing, weather 
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forecasting, imaging, and other mission critical capabilities are politically, militarily and 
economically valuable. They are also among the most vulnerable when it comes to 
damage and destruction from EMP effects. The Commission to Assess National Security 
Space Management and Organization cited low-earth orbiting satellites as particularly 
vulnerable to “severe lifetime degradation or outright failure from collateral radiation 
effects resulting from EMP attacks on ground targets”84. Without operable space assets, 
the ability of the United States to operate in cross-domain operations, joint operations or 
communicate in any meaningful way would be degraded to a significant degree, if not 
made nearly impossible. Essentially, large swaths of the U.S. military would be operating 
deaf and blind. While it is not practical to fund EMP protections on every military 
capability, space assets such as satellite navigation systems, satellite and airborne 
intelligence and targeting systems, and missile defense systems must be protected from 
every level of EMP effect to ensure the continued operational capability of strategic 
assets of the U.S. military at home and in theater. To implement EMP protections as 
acquisition and design requirements for critical military assets, like space capabilities and 
critical platforms, it will “require the personal involvement and cooperation of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the 
appropriate congressional oversight committees”85. 
In 2008, the EMP Commission released a second study on the critical 
infrastructures of the United States, in which the Commission expressed serious doubts 
that the U.S. federal government has “sufficiently robust capabilities for reliably 
assessing and managing EMP threats. The country is rapidly losing the technical 
competence needed”86 within the national labs, industry and government communities. 
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Inaction may increase the EMP threat to the United States due to widespread and openly 
available analysis showing that the United States is highly vulnerable to large-scale 
attacks on electrical critical infrastructure. Without visible, publicly reported investments 
that show a directed effort to protect infrastructure against EMP-style effects, adversarial 
actors may be incentivized to take advantage of this critical U.S. vulnerability.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT – A CASE STUDY 
On August 14, 2003, in what utility officials called “a blink-of-the-eye second”87, 
eight states in the Northeast and Midwestern United States, as well as Southeastern parts 
of Canada, experienced electrical blackout after a power line sagging due to heat and 
increased energy demand brushed against overgrown vegetation. The failure in the line 
caused others in the same network to fail, which ultimately resulted in a “massive 
outflow”88 of power as other lines and ground systems tried to cope with the extra energy. 
Eventually, the overtaxed systems shut down and cascading failures began to result in 
massive power failures across the larger grid. The effects of the blackout were 
widespread and significant; in the course of an afternoon, more than 50 million people 
were without power. Airports in the region experienced significant delays due to air 
traffic control disruption, commuters on subway trains at the time of the blackout had to 
be evacuated as trains were left stranded, and traffic lights remained out or blinking for 
hours causing widespread gridlock. Telecommunications companies reported disruption 
in service due to call volume compounded by failures at several cellular transmitters 
reliant on electricity providers within the affected area. ATM’s and bank teller machines 
were inoperable, leaving citizens without cash on hand unable to purchase flashlights, 
batteries or other emergency supplies and incidents of looting were reported in downtown 
New York City. Perhaps the most dangerous effect of the blackout was the loss of air 
conditioning in the height of summer. Citizens vulnerable to the heat began to overflow 
emergency rooms which were relying on emergency generators for power. Some reported 
vehicle-related injuries due to traffic accidents and pedestrians being hit by cars. The 
ability of emergency personnel to navigate dark and gridlocked streets to reach those in 
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need was severely hampered. The stock exchange had closed for the day and was not 
itself disrupted, though the economic impact of the blackout was later calculated to be 
near $6 billion89. 
Almost ten years later, in 2012, a report published in the journal Epidemiology 
cited nearly 100 deaths that the blackout directly caused or contributed to. The study 
found that 12 individuals perished due to accidents (vehicle or otherwise), 38 by 
cardiovascular conditions (heart attacks, some triggered by panic), three from respiratory 
problems (exacerbated asthma) and 37 from various other health conditions. The New 
York City health department blamed six deaths on carbon monoxide poisoning due to the 
blackout90. The study concluded that “power outages can immediately and severely harm 
human health” 91, whether as a direct impact or a contributing factor.  
The cause of the 2003 Northeast blackout, as determined by a comprehensive 
report by the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), was identified as long-term inadequacies within the system and 
institutional failures and weaknesses resulting in widespread cascading failure. The report 
separated the causes into four categories: failure to assess and understand the 
inadequacies in the system, inadequate situational awareness, failure to keep vegetation 
growth under control, and failure of organizations to provide real-time diagnostic 
support.92 In simple terms, the 2003 blackout was a result of a single failure compounded 
by human error and widespread system weaknesses.  
Prior to the blackout, NERC set standards for the electrical grid system but they 
were largely “administrative and technical rather than results-oriented” and represented 
“minimum requirements that may be made more stringent if appropriate by regional or 
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sub-regional bodies, but the regions have varied in their willingness to implement 
exacting reliability standards”93. Without requirements codified by the Federal 
Government, the industry created standards and best practices for itself that in many 
cases were not adequately followed or inadequately communicated to operators 
responsible for maintaining service, even under abnormal operating conditions. 
Following the release of the report, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
which expanded the role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), giving 
the agency authority to approve and enforce energy industry standards and requirements. 
These standards which were once voluntary, are now mandatory and legally enforceable.  
Human error and lack of training also contributed to the blackout. At the station in 
Ohio where the originating line came in contact with overgrown vegetation, an alarm 
system designed to alert operators of problems had gone offline more than an hour before 
the failure and no one in the control room had noticed. The failure of the alarm system 
prevented operators from re-distributing power to less overloaded transmission lines. 
Additionally, at the regional power facility in Indiana, a grid-monitoring computer 
crashed. A technician was able to fix it but left for lunch and forgot to turn the computer 
back on. Consequently, the regional power station was unable to collect data on issues 
within the regional grid and their effect on other stations, and as such, could not monitor 
or take action to prevent the cascading failures94. Once cascading failures begin, there is 
little human intervention can do to stop them. The key in preventing or responding to 
wide-scale energy failures is maintaining well-trained, prepared staff operators and 
technicians who have practiced what to do in the event blackout conditions arise. The 
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report found that “significant additional training is needed to qualify an individual to 
perform system operation and management functions”95. 
The 2003 blackout lasted for just over two days, though some areas were able to 
restore power in several hours. The blackout was widespread and disruptive, but not 
long-lasting and did not severely impact communications capabilities or any capabilities 
not directly attached to the grid. Independent electronics and vehicles were unharmed. 
General civility among the population remained intact and widespread panic was 
avoided. Blackouts like this are a good indicator of how systems typically recover from 
widespread events and what is needed in terms of technology standards and human 
intervention and training, but are not always a good measure of the enormity of an attack 
like nuclear EMP.  
First, the recovery period for an EMP crisis would be much longer and more 
demanding. Unlike blackouts, the infrastructure in an EMP attack would not just be 
damaged or offline but in some cases destroyed and not just state-by-state or regionally 
but likely across multiple regions or, if the nuclear weapon is large enough, across the 
majority of the country. Recovery time from an EMP attack would be exponentially 
longer and the process more difficult. Replacing the power transmission infrastructure is 
much more complicated than simply purchasing equipment or capabilities which were 
destroyed. In many cases, equipment used in this grid is “specially produced and has to 
be ordered from overseas… and generally takes two years to be manufactured and 
delivered”96. Though transmission units outside of the affected area could begin to restart 
others as they became repaired, this process would take weeks and gaps would occur 
where stations were waiting on destroyed units to be replaced. Without protecting this 
 56 
critical infrastructure from EMP effects, the recovery time will be weeks at a very 
minimum.  
Second, the stability of communities and civilian populations is at far higher risk 
of collapsing the longer a crisis extends. In longer-lasting recovery periods, communities 
experience wide-spread looting, opportunism and vigilante civil defense. After disasters, 
people expect help, and they expect it from federal, state and local governments working 
in concert. Emotional reactions are compounded by the paralysis of government and 
emergency services. In the 2003 blackout, civil order remained intact largely because 
communications infrastructure was unaffected and civilians were largely successful in 
contacting loved ones and getting information from federal and state officials. In an EMP 
attack, the ability to do so in a widespread manner is highly unlikely. The first 
requirement, and most stabilizing influence, in response to a disaster like EMP is the 
dissemination of information to the public. The second is bringing back the ability of the 
public to communicate with friends and loved ones they will be concerned about.  
Third, and finally, the 2003 blackout affected the ability of state and local 
emergency services to respond in a limited manner but did not affect the ability of the 
United States military or government to function. Because the stock market was 
unaffected, the financial viability of the country remained intact. Government agencies 
were able to communicate and U.S. national security assets were not degraded or 
prevented from performing critical missions. All of these critical capabilities are at risk in 
the event of nuclear EMP. Blackouts rarely test the ability of the Federal Government to 
protect national security interests and assets, beyond maintaining civil order, however it 
is in the government’s interest to consider the effects of extended blackout in concert 
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with communication infrastructure loss in national security terms. If the U.S. government 
and military capabilities are unable to communicate with one another, instability among 
government will be coupled with instability among the civilian population. Without 
visible leadership, the credibility of the United States at home and as an international 
actor will suffer immensely.  
The 2003 blackout serves as a useful example of the kinds of effects the United 
States may experience in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack. No case study is 
perfect, as this type of attack has never been perpetrated against a modern civilian 
population. However, by piecing together examples of widespread outage or damage 
caused by blackouts, severe weather events and terrorist attacks, important lessons can be 
learned about what to expect, what may be needed to respond or recover and what can be 
realistically and economically prevented. This kind of analysis also highlights the 
vulnerabilities inherent within U.S. systems and policies of response, both of which are 
well known to U.S. adversaries who wish harm against the United States – whether that 
occurs in the form of nuclear EMP, cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks or other actions. 
Up to this point, this analysis has focused on the effects of nuclear EMP, the 
capabilities of U.S. adversaries to deliver it and the consequences for the United States 
should one succeed. The following chapter will take this context and analyze how and 
why identified adversaries may employ nuclear EMP, how this threat impacts deterrence 
and what strategies the United States may be able to use to deter the employment of 
nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces abroad.  
  
 58 
CHAPTER 5: THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR EMP 
The employment of a nuclear weapon with the intention of creating widespread 
EMP effects is a viable option of attack for both state and non-state actors. The capability 
to employ a nuclear weapon in this manner is available to existing nuclear weapon states 
like Russia and China, rogue states like North Korea and Iran, as well as to terrorist 
organizations who are able to acquire the capability either through purchase or, less 
likely, through independent development. The fact remains, however, that employment of 
a nuclear weapon is a serious action and the effort required to gain the ability to do so is 
immense. For an actor to expel that amount of effort and to take on extreme political and 
security risks, the utility of employment must be quite high. This chapter will explore the 
motivations behind the employment of EMP and why it remains a viable option or goal 
for adversaries of the United States in the 21st century environment. 
 
Rogue States 
The employment of WMD is attractive to rogue states like Iran and North Korea 
because it provides them an asymmetric response to U.S. technological and conventional 
superiority and complicates U.S. response options. Rogue states are most likely to 
employ nuclear EMP as a battlefield component of an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy: 
employ a nuclear weapon at high-altitude, in theater, to severely hamper the ability of 
U.S. and allied forces to communicate, maneuver, recover or respond; or employ a 
nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a U.S. ally or partner, creating a regional crisis and 
forcing the United States to act or remain out of the conflict; or employ a small nuclear 
weapon at high-altitude above the United States, demonstrating nuclear weapons 
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capability, lowering U.S. resolve to respond or intervene in regional conflicts, and 
impacting the ability of the United States to operate, in a limited manner.  
The employment of WMD, or threat of employment, can be useful in influencing 
the decisions or actions of U.S. allies. It is possible that rogue states would threaten the 
employment of WMD against U.S. allies, friends or coalition members to frighten them 
out of cooperation with the United States, either in the form of U.S. basing abroad or 
political, military and economic support. The strategic goals of rogue states, such as 
regime survival and regional hegemony, are most threatened by the presence and actions 
of the United States military in the region.  
However, experts today are in disagreement about where North Korea would most 
likely employ nuclear EMP. While a “Taepo Dong-2 missile launched from North Korea 
probably could deliver a warhead 300 miles above America, enough to degrade electronic 
systems throughout the country,”97 this may guarantee an overwhelming response from 
the United States that would devastate the North Korean regime. As a strategic option for 
ending a regional conflict, this action by North Korea is highly unlikely and irrational98. 
There is little utility in perpetrating an attack against the U.S. homeland that would likely 
result in the end of the North Korean regime, by the hands of the United States or its 
allies. Far more likely, is the employment of a North Korean nuclear weapon in the 
atmosphere above the Korean peninsula in an attempt to cripple U.S. and South Korean 
military capabilities present in theater, possibly as a first step in a larger campaign. North 
Korean technical capabilities are less likely to be affected by EMP (either through 
protection or limited sophistication) and would remain operable enough to execute 
military missions on the peninsula as U.S. and South Korean forces attempted to recover. 
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However, if the North Korean regime were to perceive that it would not survive a 
conflict, regardless of U.S. and allied response, it may very well decide to employ nuclear 
EMP against the U.S. homeland as a final act in an attempt to bring the United States to 
its knees. 
Iran’s decision calculus for nuclear EMP is likely very similar. Iran’s desire to be 
the reigning regional power in the Middle East is the driving force behind its missile and 
nuclear programs. Without either, Iran’s ability to project power and influence the 
regional security environment would be severely limited. Protecting the ability to 
influence the security dynamics of the region and act as the pivotal regional power is 
essential to maintaining control and to the survival of the Iranian regime as it currently 
stands. Employment of nuclear EMP in theater would cripple any regional forces or 
assets and would enable the regime to act decisively without the threat of intervention, by 
the U.S. or another regional adversary. Israel has recognized the utility of this strategy 
and has taken measures to protect its assets and capabilities against nuclear EMP in order 
to maintain the ability to respond.99 The United States would be forced to make difficult 
decisions about potential responses and policy moving forward. Unlike the environment 
on the Korean peninsula, the United States would be facing a much more complex and 
volatile security situation with far more chances for miscalculation.  
Iran certainly possesses the ability to employ nuclear EMP against the U.S. 
homeland but, similar to North Korea, has little reason to do so outside of dire 
circumstances. The risk of an overwhelming response by the United States is much lower 
if Iran were to employ nuclear EMP in theater. An “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is 
much more likely to succeed if U.S. civilians and the homeland are unharmed, leaving 
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the United States’ interpretation of proportional response much narrower. However, if 
Iran were to employ nuclear EMP against the United States homeland, an overwhelming 
response, nuclear or conventional, is much more likely – even if the deployment of 
conventional assets is more difficult; the risk-reward calculus is much more skewed. In 
the case of both Iran and North Korea, the response of the international community to an 
attack on the U.S. homeland, rather than the employment of nuclear EMP in a crisis or 
battlefield scenario, would likely be swift and decisive. For two states who value survival 
above all else, the risk of an attack of such magnitude against the United States at home is 
far higher than the reward. 
 
Terrorist Organizations 
As demonstrated by the attacks of September 11th, “our enemies will seek to 
attack in ways we are not prepared for, using methodologies that have not previously 
been tried”100. Nuclear EMP represents a unique challenge and opportunity to terrorist 
organizations. While it is difficult for terrorist organizations to acquire the technology 
and materials needed to successfully execute a nuclear EMP attack, if executed 
successfully, the event and its aftermath would be highly visible and widely covered. 
Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIL have publicly announced their desire for 
WMD capabilities and include “using the technology of directed energy weapons or 
EMP” as part of their information warfare campaigns101. The beauty of EMP for terrorist 
organizations is its indiscriminate nature: the U.S. military is not the only entity severely 
affected by EMP; the U.S. public relies on electronic systems that would also be severely 
impacted, degraded or destroyed. While the non-discriminatory aspect of EMP may deter 
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a state actor from using it against the U.S. homeland (making it more attractive as a 
battlefield weapon), a terrorist may very well find great utility in it.  
The national security community is divided on how sophisticated the technology 
required to produce EMP effects must be and, as a result, which actors are capable of 
employing nuclear EMP. One side believes the technical requirements of a nuclear 
weapon capable of producing EMP are too sophisticated and as such, are a barrier to 
terrorist acquisition and use; ultimately, they believe that a crude nuclear weapons 
package will not produce the desired effects. The weapon must have a trigger 
mechanism, electronics and complicated physics package as well as be compact enough 
to fit onto a ballistic missile or other sophisticated missile system102. In their view, it is 
highly unlikely that a terrorist organization could successfully steal these capabilities; yet 
it is possible they could be purchased. Iran and North Korea are the most likely sellers of 
ballistic missiles to terrorist organizations, however they are unlikely to do so after 
spending significant money and time on their own programs while simultaneously 
incurring political and security risks. The sale of nuclear material and technology is much 
more difficult and monitored closely by the international community. Programs like 
Cooperative Threat Reduction, international agencies like the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and international communities, such as signatories to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, ensure, to the best of their ability, that nuclear material does not 
enter the hands of terrorist organizations. However, if a terrorist organization were able to 
successfully purchase or steal a complete nuclear weapons package, fitting it onto a 
missile it was not designed for would be equally technically challenging. For an 
organization to be successful in both areas, it would need significant time, money and 
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likely capable members or partners. However, cooperation with a terrorist organization, 
especially for Iran, is not outside the realm of possibility, as it would complicate 
attribution and pose significant challenges for the United States when determining 
proportionate response. North Korea is less likely to engage in such activity, as they do 
not have a long history of state-sponsored terrorism on a large-scale and keep a close 
hold on their technological achievements. However, the other side of the community 
argues that the barrier to employment of nuclear EMP is not as high as described here and 
that EMP effects can be achieved with low-yield nuclear weapons, launched from 
relatively unsophisticated missiles at close-range. As mentioned previously, all a missile 
needs to do is go up. If a terrorist organization could, for example, launch a 10kt weapon 
(the size believed to be in the North Korean nuclear arsenal) with a short-range missile 
off the coast of the United States from a cargo or transportation ship, it would likely 
succeed in producing EMP effects up and down the coast of the United States103. 
While the challenges facing a terrorist organization in acquiring nuclear 
technology and missile capabilities are daunting, they are not impossible to overcome. 
Once a terrorist organization has acquired the necessary materials and technology, it is 
unlikely to hold onto it for long. Terrorist use of WMD has long been on the agenda and 
once acquired, the organization is unlikely to wait to employ it, for fear of losing it to 
adversaries who locate it and deny their ability to employ it. Depending on the 
organization, it may be far more useful to employ a crude nuclear device in a more 
traditional terror attack, such as a truck bomb, than go through the effort to employ a 
successful EMP attack. How a terrorist organization chooses to employ WMD depends 
completely on desired effect. If an organization is willing to take a longer view, it may 
 64 
very well decide upon nuclear EMP due to the existential nature of the threat against the 
United States. 
 
Russia and China 
Unlike rogue states and terrorist organizations, nuclear EMP fits into a larger asymmetric 
strategy for nuclear weapon states, in this case Russia and China. As has been previously 
discussed, nuclear EMP does not represent a stand-alone strategy for either of these 
actors but enables a larger asymmetric strategy to succeed. Nuclear weapons still act as a 
counter to the conventional superiority of the United States and will continue to do so in 
relations between Russia and China and the United States. However, the utility of nuclear 
EMP is in its ambiguity as to whether it is considered employment of a nuclear weapon in 
the traditional sense and therefore, whether employment of nuclear EMP is considered a 
crossing of the nuclear threshold. The nuclear EMP policies of Russia and China suggest 
that these two states believe the risk the United States would view nuclear EMP as a 
crossing of the nuclear threshold and respond with nuclear weapons is low104. The 
Russian belief in this theory is so strong that they have in the past made threats of nuclear 
EMP based on it: “In 1999, for example, at a high level meeting in Vienna of a 
Congressional delegation with senior members of the Russian government, Vladimir 
Lukin, the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, angry with American 
policy in the Balkans, issued the following threat: ‘If we really wanted to hurt you with 
no fear of retaliation, we would launch a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), 
[and] we would detonate a nuclear weapon high above your country and shut down your 
power grid’.”105 
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Both Russia and China would benefit from a United States forced to retreat from the 
global stage as it recovered from a devastatingly successful nuclear EMP attack. Russia 
would emerge as the militarily superior power and China as the economic super power of 
the world. Both would enjoy increased influence in their respective regions and face little 
resistance to their expansionist strategies and territorial claims. Though NATO would 
likely invoke Article 5 and attempt to respond to Russia, without the capabilities of the 
United States, the alliance would struggle to match the military might of the Russian 
Federation. The security environment in Europe would drastically change without the 
deterrent effect of a NATO backed by U.S. nuclear capabilities. The Baltic States would 
likely face a rapidly expansionist Russia and events like those witnessed in Crimea, 
Ukraine in 2013 would be further enabled. China’s claims to islands in the South China 
Sea would largely go unanswered and the security of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan 
would lessen dramatically. In either case, it is likely that regional conflicts and crises 
would break out with very limited U.S. aid or none at all. Though cooperation between 
Russia and China in executing a nuclear EMP attack against the United States is highly 
unlikely, one would certainly reap benefits from the action of the other. There is a high 
likelihood that breakdowns in security in both regions would occur, regardless of who 
perpetrated the attack. Russia and China recognize the opportunity nuclear EMP affords 
them and has prepared their nuclear weapons and missile systems to be capable of 
carrying it out. Through viewing nuclear EMP as an asymmetric capability, they increase 
both the utility of it and the likelihood that it may be employed in today’s security 
environment. 
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Actor Threat Level Target Region Capability 
Russia Moderate U.S. Homeland High-yield NW, Ballistic 
Missile 
China Moderate U.S. Homeland/In 
Theater 
High-yield NW, Ballistic 
Missile 
Iran Low In Theater Low-yield NW, Ballistic or 
Cruise Missile 
North Korea Low In Theater Low- or High-yield NW, 
Ballistic or Cruise Missile 
Terrorist 
Organization 
Low U.S. Homeland Low-yield NW, Crude 
Ballistic or Cruise Missile 
 
Table 1. Level of EMP Threat According to Actor 
Nuclear EMP presents a unique opportunity to state and non-state actors alike. 
While the threat of nuclear weapons employment against the U.S. homeland has been 
reduced since the end of the Cold War, the utility of the employment of nuclear EMP has 
risen dramatically. U.S. reliance on sophisticated electronics and technologically 
advanced systems has created a vulnerability that now represents an existential threat to 
the existence of the United States in its current form. No other threat facing the United 
States in the 21st century security environment represents greater consequences, 
regardless of its low likelihood. The following chapter analyzes how the threat of nuclear 
EMP, as portrayed by the actors discussed here, impacts and challenges traditional 
strategic deterrence and recommends the best deterrence strategies to reduce the risk of 
employment or deter attack altogether. 
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CHAPTER 6: NUCLEAR EMP AND DETERRENCE 
Deterrence during the Cold War relied on the mutual understanding that nuclear 
employment by one side would result in massive retaliation by the other. In the modern 
warfare environment, massive retaliation has largely fallen by the wayside, replaced by 
theories such as tailored deterrence, minimum deterrence and escalation control. The act 
of deterring nuclear weapons employment includes more than the employment of nuclear 
weapons in return but includes the ability to deny successful employment through 
capabilities such as missile defense. As the deterrence picture became more complicated, 
so did the threats. During the Cold War, nuclear EMP was a component of nuclear 
employment, provoking the same result as detonating a nuclear weapon on enemy 
territory. There was no daylight between the types of employment one could choose and 
the response they received. The same is not true for today. Traditional approaches to 
nuclear deterrence do not fully encompass or address the threat of nuclear 
electromagnetic pulse. If the United States is to deter or deny the employment of nuclear 
EMP against its homeland and forces and allies abroad, it must take current deterrence 
policy and shape it to specifically address this threat, regardless of who poses it.  
The 2004 EMP Commission began its analysis with upfront recommendations, 
one of the first of which was to determine and develop a deterrence strategy designed to 
counter the threat posed by nuclear EMP106, which would then be supplemented by 
improvements in the protections of U.S. critical infrastructure systems and U.S. military 
assets. As discussed in previous chapters, a tangible step the United States can take in 
deterring an EMP attack is investing in physical protections of U.S. critical infrastructure, 
including key transmission lines in the electrical grid, U.S. space assets (military and 
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commercial), and strategic nuclear forces. As spending on nuclear weapons declined, so 
did “budgets for programs to harden key satellite, communications and other critical 
nuclear and non-nuclear supporting equipment and facilities to the effects of nuclear-
induced electromagnetic pulse…the failure to spend funds to maintain the hardness 
against EMP…may be compounded by our increasing reliance on commercial off-the-
shelf technology. … If nuclear weapons and supporting systems, such as the systems that 
warn of a missile attack, do not survive or do not operate as planned, they will not 
support robust and flexible deterrence”107. The United States can also conduct training 
exercises designed to train civilian and military personnel at all levels of critical 
infrastructure how to recognize an EMP attack and what to do in the immediate 
aftermath. Doing so in a deliberate and public manner will not only heighten U.S. 
consciousness of the threat and prepare both civilian and military agencies for 
emergencies, but lower the level of high-consequence risk to the United States and make 
an EMP attack less attractive to adversaries. Reduced consequences have a direct 
correlation in reducing risk and probability of attack. Additionally if the United States 
can protect civilian and military assets in a meaningful way, the risk of delayed response 
due to distraction by the level of devastation at home is far less and would contribute to a 
credible threat of response. In fact, not investing in such protections, may incentivize an 
adversary to choose nuclear EMP as a course of action due to their belief that the United 
States would be blindsided and further incapacitated.  
U.S. national security strategies over the years have contributed indirectly to the 
deterrence of nuclear EMP and the defense of the nation and its allies through taking 
actions to strengthen alliances to defeat terrorism and strengthen and enforce counter-
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proliferation and non-proliferation regimes, both independently and as part of global 
partnerships108. These actions contribute significantly to the deterrence of terrorist 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon or sophisticated missile technology, but do little to deter 
the employment of nuclear EMP once already acquired. The same national security 
strategies have called for increased ballistic missile defense and global precision strike 
capabilities, both of which increase the ability of the United States to defend against 
incoming missile threats to the homeland but do little to deter employment of nuclear 
EMP. Currently, the only missile defense system capable of intercepting and destroying a 
missile exo-atmospherically is the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
system. THAAD has only successfully demonstrated the capability to destroy missiles 
outside the Earth’s atmosphere twice109, one of which was a Medium-range ballistic 
missile. While this is an achievement in missile defense technology, its contribution to 
the deterrence of nuclear EMP is less significant. U.S. missile defense systems would 
need to identify a missile as intended for nuclear EMP and intercept and destroy it prior 
to its exit from Earth’s atmosphere, where it would be designed to detonate for maximum 
EMP effect. To contribute in a significant way to deterrence or defense against nuclear 
EMP, THAAD would be required to work far more often and at a much earlier stage than 
it is currently designed. The capabilities of U.S. missile defenses simply “remain 
uncertain at best”110 and do not address the technical challenges of defending against 
high-altitude nuclear detonations.  
Tangible protection measures, specialized training, international efforts to prevent 
technology and material transfer, and kinetic defenses all contribute to the defense and 
deterrence of nuclear EMP but do not lower risk to an acceptable level on their own. 
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These measures must be supplemented by a strong deterrence strategy. Lawrence 
Freedman, the prolific thinker on deterrence strategy, wrote in 2004 that deterrence “in 
all cases is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with 
the crossing of those boundaries…During the Cold War…the study of deterrence became 
synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the Cold War. The confrontation 
defined the concept rather than the concept the confrontation”111. In the case of nuclear 
EMP, the current view of the United States is much the same; the confrontation defines 
the concept of deterrence, rather than deterrence of the confrontation defining the 
landscape in which it exists. To ignore the landscape out of which the threat emanates is 
to ignore the reasons behind why actors would choose to employ nuclear EMP in the first 
place. With these reasons understood, the United States must now create a strategy of 
deterrence that defines the confrontation of nuclear EMP. 
For a credible deterrence strategy to be formed around the issue of nuclear EMP, 
the United States must first be willing to unambiguously designate the employment of a 
nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects as a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Doing so 
upends the strategic calculus of adversaries like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea who 
believe that the United States may not classify it as such and as a result, may exercise 
restraint in response112. Strategic ambiguity does not serve the United States well when it 
comes to the threat of nuclear EMP, mainly due to the fact that the very ability of the 
United States to respond may be hampered by the effects of the attack itself. Strategic 
nuclear forces will likely survive, and depending on the location of the detonation, 
regional assets are likely to as well. Though the United States may choose not to respond 
with a nuclear weapon detonation on the perpetrators territory, it must remain a clear and 
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viable option. The nature of U.S. employment of a nuclear weapon in response - whether 
it be a high-altitude detonation over the perpetrators territory, a low-yield, tactical ground 
burst, or an air-burst targeting military assets – can remain ambiguous, but the United 
States must be willing to maintain the long-held policy that an action crossing the nuclear 
threshold will incur a proportionate and necessary response. As Freedman writes, “when 
using deterrence to defend an interest, it is necessary not only to demonstrate how 
deterrence will work if challenged but also the nature of the interest to be defended”113. 
Nuclear EMP, as an existential threat, threatens the greatest security interest of the United 
States: to maintain the security of the homeland, the safety of U.S. citizens and the role of 
the United States in the world as a leading democratic power.  
Establishing a declaratory policy that outlines the employment of nuclear EMP as 
a violation of the nuclear threshold allows the United States to then tailor the strategy to 
address the two aspects of the threat: deter employment of EMP in theater and deter 
employment of EMP against the U.S. homeland. Unlike the strategic nuclear deterrence 
strategies used today to deter nuclear employment in more traditional ways, deterrence 
strategies for EMP need not be tailored by actor but by employment scenario. The results 
for the actor who chooses to employ nuclear EMP should be largely the same, regardless 
of who the actor may be. For North Korea and Iran, those results likely mean the end of 
their regime – which speaks to their greatest strategic interest. For states like Russia and 
China, those results mean devastating response on their homeland with the risk of 
triggering a large-scale conflict that is outside of their interests and does not achieve the 
strategic goal they hoped to through employment of nuclear EMP. Terrorist 
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organizations, however, are a different animal altogether and must be considered 
separately.  
Additionally, any strategy designed to deter nuclear EMP must maintain the 
freedom of the United States to respond across domains. Should an adversary employ 
nuclear EMP with the intention of solely targeting U.S. space assets (though the physics 
of a high-altitude nuclear detonation would likely result in effects terrestrially as well), 
the United States should be clear in its declaratory policy that it maintains the freedom 
and capability to respond to the perpetrator both in space and on earth. Due to the fact 
that rules of engagement in space are not established and norms of weapons in space are 
increasingly challenged, the risk of nuclear EMP employment specifically designed to 
effect space assets is rising. In creating a strong policy on responses to nuclear EMP in 
space, the United States may well lead the way in establishing deterrence norms about the 
weaponization of the space domain, which in turn complicates the risk calculus for actors 
looking to exploit vulnerabilities in space and enhances terrestrial deterrence strategies. 
Though deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is priority number one, 
the likelihood of nuclear EMP employment is far higher in theater because the utility in 
an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is greater. Deterring an actor from employing a 
nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a conflict zone not only requires the credible 
capability of U.S. and allied forces to survive enough to respond quickly and in kind, but 
requires a declaratory policy that is detailed and clear in its approach to response. The 
United States must credibly convince the actor that crossing the nuclear threshold with 
the employment of EMP would not only prompt devastating U.S. action against the 
regime’s homeland in the form of targeted nuclear response against military assets, such 
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as identified nuclear weapons facilities (ensuring the inability to launch additional 
nuclear weapons), but overwhelming conventional response as well. 
Deterrence of the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland looks 
slightly different because the intended effects are different, are intended to occur on a 
much larger scale and impact the U.S. civilian population in significant and potentially 
long-lasting ways. The ability of the United States to credibly deny an adversary the 
capabilities or chance to employ nuclear EMP against the United States is much more 
important in this scenario than it is in theater. U.S. nonproliferation and counter-
proliferation efforts will go a long way in denying adversaries like Iran, North Korea and 
terrorist organizations the ability to acquire sophisticated enough technology to launch a 
nuclear EMP attack from their own territory. Denying their ability to launch an attack 
from a mobile position, such as a freight cargo ship in the oceans off the coast of the 
United States, is much more difficult and depends upon international cooperation in 
intelligence and interdiction efforts. Improved homeland missile defenses with the 
capability to monitor and destroy missile threats before they exit Earth’s atmosphere and 
hardened, survivable space assets (both civilian and military) would also contribute to 
credible denial efforts for actors like Russia and China who would not be affected by 
efforts to control technology and materials.  
The key in deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is in convincing an 
actor that their attempt at crippling the United States will either not be as effective as 
intended or will not succeed at all. The greater the survivability of the United States, the 
greater the chance of instant and overwhelming response, therefore making the risk 
greater than the potential reward. If the United States can succeed in credibly defending 
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the capabilities needed to respond to a nuclear EMP attack, such as strategic nuclear 
weapon systems, communications, and command and control, then an aggressive 
declaratory policy in which nuclear employment is not a last resort is much more 
effective; this of course does not mean that an overwhelming conventional response 
would not be seen as proportional. However, the United States should make clear that 
self-deterrence will not be a consideration in response to nuclear EMP attacks against the 
U.S. homeland, eliminating any doubt that the United States would be unwilling to 
respond to a nuclear non-casualty event with nuclear weapons. 
The act of deterring a terrorist organization from employing nuclear EMP is more 
difficult, though not impossible. Declaratory policy and threats against the “homeland” of 
a terrorist organization are less effective because terrorist organizations are often located 
amongst innocent civilian populations and within the borders of sovereign nations, who 
may or may not have been involved or complicit in an attack. In the case of terrorist 
employment of EMP, self-deterrence is a serious consideration on the part of the United 
States. That being said, terrorism and terrorist employment of WMD is not an abstract 
concept to U.S. national security experts and planners. If those same experts can be 
convinced of the reality of nuclear EMP as a threat to the U.S. homeland, that is likely a 
community that can galvanize efforts to protect critical infrastructure against the threat. 
As Freedman explains, “the argument that deterrence does not work with terrorism can be 
challenged, not because for every terrorist challenge a sure-fire form of deterrence can be 
devised, but because over time it becomes apparent that this is a threat for which the 
community has made adequate provision to the point where, even if some attacks 
succeed, little of political consequence will follow and those responsible can expect they 
 75 
will be hunted down and punished”114. In this same vein, if the United States can 
convince state actors, like Iran, that their sponsorship or aid of a terrorist organization in 
acquiring nuclear EMP capabilities will be treated with the same severity of response as 
those who perpetrated the attack itself, the United States may be successful in deterring 
terrorist acquisition of EMP capabilities in the first place. However, proportional 
response means little to a terrorist organization who already has the capability and threats 
of U.S. nuclear employment against them are neither very credible nor realistic. Instead, 
strategies of containment and disruption are most likely to prevent a terrorist organization 
from acquiring the necessary capability and strategies of prevention and denial are most 
effective in convincing a terrorist organization that nuclear EMP will not succeed in 
achieving their goals. Though terrorist employment of WMD in less sophisticated ways, 
such as crude bombs in trucks or pressure cookers, would be devastating, it would be far 
less consequential for the United States in the long-term than an effective nuclear EMP 
attack.  
Nuclear EMP poses a unique deterrence challenge for the United States, a country 
which has typically relied upon traditional strategic deterrence strategies to deter high-
end nuclear employment and large-scale conventional conflict. Nuclear EMP in the 21st 
century, while still employment of a nuclear weapon, exists in an inherently different 
threat realm as an asymmetric tool. It is for this reason, and the potential crippling impact 
on U.S. capabilities, that nuclear EMP represents such an attractive option to U.S. 
adversaries. The United States must recognize this fact and shift its own thinking 
regarding the utility of nuclear EMP for a range of adversaries. In doing so, the United 
States will not only increase its own understanding of strategic deterrence in the 21st 
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century but also begin to effectively deter threats and defend the U.S. homeland, U.S. 
allies and friends from actions that threaten to alter the security landscape for years to 
come.  
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CONCLUSION 
The United States has faced a myriad of threats since those first nuclear weapons 
tests in 1962 exhibited electromagnetic pulse effects, from all-out nuclear war to 
terrorism to regional conflict. It is highly unusual that a threat of an era long thought over 
would return to be more salient than it was at its inception. However, as the United States 
became increasingly reliant on technology and advances in communications, energy 
technology, transportation, electronics and military capabilities proliferated, a 
vulnerability – an invisible Achilles heel – presented itself. Adversaries of the United 
States did not walk away from the Cold War era in the same way the United States did 
and they learned different lessons from the capabilities and strategies of those decades. 
The United States developed strategies dependent upon its ability to assert its military 
dominance, enabled by capabilities like precision strike and advances in communications 
and electronics. These capabilities and the technology that enables them, are the Achilles 
heel adversaries seek to exploit.  
While the United States attempted to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, they 
became increasingly valuable to actors who could never compete with conventionally 
superior adversaries. The United States, in many ways, became intellectually lazy in its 
assessment of adversary motivations, capabilities and intentions. These trends have 
contributed to the complex security environment of today, one in which the United States 
finds itself existentially vulnerable to a threat it doesn’t believe is there in any meaningful 
way. This is reflective of the kind of thinking that precipitated the attacks of September 
11, 2001: a lack of creativity and out-of-the-box thinking that results in almost willful 
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blindness to credible, potentially devastating threats that, once they occur, change the 
fundamental fabric of the nation. 
As discussed and analyzed in the pages here, the United States has the tools to 
prevent or deter this threat, if it is willing to acknowledge it. The following are 
recommendations for the United States government and its friends and allies to best deter 
and prevent the unthinkable from becoming reality: 
1. Immediately invest in the protection of critical infrastructure, especially those that 
would take the longest to repair or replace (Large turbines, generators, high-
voltage transformers, key regional electrical grid stations, air traffic control, water 
filtration and distribution centers, government communications, command and 
control, critical components of the financial industry, and perhaps most 
importantly, space assets – especially low-earth orbit satellites, both commercial 
and military). Some individual U.S. states have begun to invest in their own 
protections against EMP. Maine, Virginia and Arizona have all passed their own 
laws about hardening against EMP. Florida has established a Cyber and EMP 
Legislative working group115. The Federal Government can follow by expanding 
the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructures Act of 2014 to include 
threats from nuclear EMP and implementing the recommendations of the EMP 
Commission reports as well as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. 
 
2. Publicly classify employment of a nuclear weapon to create EMP effects as an act 
that crosses the nuclear threshold, no exceptions. 
 
3. Develop a sophisticated and specific deterrence strategy for EMP attacks against 
the U.S. homeland and EMP attacks in theater. Conduct studies to determine the 
utility and impact of ambiguity on deterrence of nuclear EMP116. 
 
4. Specifically identify nuclear EMP as a threat in publicly released policy and 
strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense 
Reviews, National Planning Scenarios, etc. Send a signal to adversaries that this 
threat does not go unnoticed by the U.S. government. Lay the groundwork for 
contributing to deterrence and denial. 
 
5. Improve U.S. cross-domain capabilities. Actively participate in exercises 
independently and with allies demonstrating cross-domain operational 
capabilities.  
 
6. Strengthen partnerships with U.S. allies and friends to improve intelligence and 
interdiction of nuclear material and ballistic missile technology.  
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7. Seek to improve U.S. missile defense capabilities to recognize and deny nuclear 
EMP attacks. 
 
8. Define the responsibilities of the Federal Government, state and local 
governments and the private sector in recovering from an EMP attack against the 
U.S. homeland. Equip and train individuals and agencies to respond specifically 
to EMP effects. As of 2008, the EMP Commission was unable to convince the 
Department of Homeland Security to include an EMP attack as one of the 
National Planning Scenarios117; this should be priority number one in terms of 
equipping federal agencies with responsibilities and action items in the event of a 
nuclear EMP attack.  
 
9. Continue to fund, for the next five to ten years, the Congressional EMP 
Commission which was re-established in the 2016 National Defense 
Authorization Act. Require reports on the study requirements as laid out in the 
NDAA, including the vulnerability of U.S. military systems; the evolving current 
and future threat; new technologies, procedures and contingency planning efforts 
to protect against EMP; priorities for protection in each U.S. state; and the degree 
of vulnerabilities in cascading failures118. Expand the study requirements to 
include a study of the deterrence requirements and strategies that may be 
employed against the threat of nuclear EMP for each actor capable of executing 
the threat. 
 
The United States remains the pre-eminent military power in the world and 
continues to lead the way in technological advancements. As the security environment 
becomes more complex, U.S. leadership will continue to play a role in creating a safer 
world for many across the globe. To ignore capabilities and intentions that threaten that 
role, not to mention the lives of its citizens and military personnel, is to ignore the 
fundamental responsibilities and values the United States has for so long upheld. The 
threat of nuclear EMP is real, present and clear. It is long past time the United States take 
action to mitigate this threat and modernize its approach to deterrence in the 21st century.
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